

The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

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for Teachers and Students of History

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No. 4

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
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Russia and World Peace

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University of San Francisco, California

THE scope and complexity of the problems which the liquidation of the Nazi terror will inevitably bequeath to the world is beginning to dawn upon the collective consciousness. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the rightness or the wrongness, the justice or the injustice of specific details in the probable post-war peace settlement. This paper assumes, however regretfully, that not every detail of that settlement will fulfill the requirements of strict justice. Its purpose is to explore the possibility of collaboration with Soviet Russia in an admittedly imperfect world.

Overshadowing all other problems in importance is the question of the position of the Soviet Union in the post-war world. It is a question about which everyone is thinking. Frank discussion of the question was long put off upon the theory that nothing could be allowed to disturb Allied unity, of paramount importance to the successful defeat of the common enemy. The theory had a sound basis, but it also had certain inevitable inconveniences. This is especially true vis-à-vis the American people who have never been adequately educated in the facts of international life.

Trend to the Left

There is scarcely a detail in the pattern of problem and policy which is beginning to emerge from the confusion of war which could not have been foreseen four years ago. As the tide of Nazi conquest and tyranny is rolled back, submerged peoples and countries appear in unfamiliar contours. These contours, although unfamiliar, should not have been unexpected. Even those who liked the kind of a world we had before the Mussolini-Hitler era should have realized that the Europe which had lived intimately with violence, terror, starvation,

and death for all the years of Nazi domination could not restore—would have no desire to restore—the social patterns whose inadequacy had been pitilessly revealed in the past two decades. None but the completely naive could have failed to realize that the Europe which comes out of this war would have moved socially and politically far to the Left. To have seen a whole world plunged into the abyss by the power lusts of a mad megalomaniac, not to have known for years the meaning of security, to have lived under the constant apprehension of death and terror, to have felt the abiding nearness of starvation, to have beheld one's country over-run by a brutal oppressor, to have watched the sickening spectacle of some of your wealthy industrialists, faithful to the shoddy standard of values which makes a god of money and of honor a joke, turning a pretty penny by collaboration with the enemy,—these are not experiences which make political Rightists out of people.

It is a measure of their remoteness from reality that many Americans are now surprised and confused at the signs of the trend to the Left in Europe. When de Gaulle announced that the government intended to nationalize the coal-mines and take over control of the Renault Automobile Plant, a Catholic publicist in this country noted the fact with what one senses, perhaps unfairly, is a tone of injured surprise, as though de Gaulle were somehow betraying a trust. Does he expect the French people meekly to turn back the automobile plant to the Renaults who lined their coffers making tanks for the Nazis during the years of occupation? And if the nationalization of coal-mines disturbs him, he is in for a series of unpleasant shocks because the process of nationalization is going to go much beyond coal-mines in all the liberated countries of Europe.

It should hardly be necessary to define what I mean by a trend to the Left. In a modern context the word is sufficiently clear. In general I mean a trend towards the adoption of a greater or lesser part of the Socialist program. For the benefit of those Catholics who are mistakenly prone to regard any move to the Left as bad, it should be pointed out that because measures form part of the Socialist program of social reform they are not necessarily to be condemned. Pope Pius XI has pointed out that the Socialist "programs often strikingly approach the just demands of Christian social reformers." I regard the trend to the Left in Europe as in itself necessary and inevitable. It is to be noted that the Catholic Democratic group in France has endorsed a program of nationalization far more extensive than anything the de Gaulle government has yet attempted to carry out. It is also to be noted that prominent leaders of the Church, among them the Archbishop of Paris and the Archbishop of Toulouse have indicated unmistakable approval of this general orientation of policy.

The chief point being made here, however, is that this trend should have been anticipated. All that any American need to have done to have arrived at a sound judgment as to the future social and political trends in Europe was to have proposed to himself the hypothetical question: If the depression of 1932 had been forty times as severe in intensity as it was, and if it had continued without relief for five or six years would the American people have moved leftward or rightward?

Roots of Allied Differences

What is true of the social trends in Europe is equally true of developments on the level of international politics. From the moment that Germany attacked Russia the problem of postwar settlement, in the event of an allied victory, was immensely complicated. The complications arose from these facts: 1) Between the political and social systems and ideals of the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies lie very great differences; 2) as a consequence of this and of the anti-Soviet policies of the preceding twenty years deep suspicion and mutual distrust divide the Soviet Union from the other United Nations; 3) in the event of an allied victory it was inevitable that the Soviet Union, particularly as she had played a leading part in the winning of that victory, would have certain minimum demands to make which would conflict with the desires of her allies. For example, it was clear to any student of international politics from the moment that Nazi Germany launched her attack upon Russia that, in the event of a Nazi defeat, the Soviet Union would insist upon retaining her control of the three Baltic States and of the eastern third of Poland.

If these facts were not openly admitted, it was because, though we did not like them, the imperative necessity of the greatest possible unity of effort against a common enemy forced us to thrust into the background discussion of issues which contained the seeds of distrust and disunion. The question of the boundaries of a liberated Poland, for example, could hardly be made the subject of discussion among the allies if that discussion

were to lead to a breakdown in the united fronts which would assure a German victory. With Germany victorious there would have been no Poland, and thus the question of the boundaries of a liberated Poland would have become purely academic in character.

Now as countries which have lain under the Nazi yoke are at last liberated, and as the end of the war appears not too far distant, these differences are of necessity beginning to appear. Their appearance, with the accompanying suggestion that the peace settlement will not be exactly utopian in character and that it will in some respects fall considerably short of the ideal of strict justice, has resulted, in the case of some Americans, in an attitude of disillusionment and cynicism.

It must be admitted that, on the whole, the reactions of the American people have evinced a greater awareness of the facts of international life than would have been the case twenty, or even ten, years ago. Nevertheless, there are not a few voices uttering counsels of despair. Among them are those who are not so much ignorant as they are malicious. Others are not so much malicious as naive. They expected a perfect world to emerge at once from this struggle. The world they are going to get will be less than perfect. So, adopting an attitude which Dr. Waldemar Gurian has properly described as "perfectionist nihilism," they deplore the fact that we ever allowed ourselves to become involved in the struggle and advocate washing our hands of the whole mess. Because we are not going to get a paradise on earth out of this war, they are in effect suggesting that we should have all collectively thrown ourselves into hell.

Erroneous Views

It is necessary to analyze some of the erroneous habits of thought which contribute to this unrealistic, and therefore highly dangerous, attitude.

1) There is a confusion here between the ideal kind of a world we should like to have and the imperfect world we have to deal with. It helps not at all towards bettering the conditions of the world to forget that this is a sinful world inhabited by sinful men, ourselves included. One of the fundamental errors of Communism, perhaps the most fundamental error, is that it ignores original sin and hence concludes that the elimination of private property will eliminate all that is vicious in the world. It is surprising that Christians sometimes reveal a tendency to forget the fact of original sin. He who angrily insists that unless every form of power politics is eliminated from the peace settlement and unless that settlement conform in every respect to all demands of perfect justice, we shall have been betrayed and should therefore refuse to have anything to do with such a peace settlement, is forgetful of original sin. He is a victim of the illusion of the nineteenth century optimists with their naive belief in an inexorable evolutionary progress towards the best of all possible worlds.

The fact is that an optimistic view of human nature can only be maintained at the expense of truth. The immensity of evil in human nature strongly contrasts with the scarcity of good. Those who stubbornly refuse to face this fact condemn themselves to perpetual oscillation.

(Please turn to page eighty-three)

Argentina and the Church

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SO much of late has been written about Argentina that one hesitates to add still another unit to the books, articles, and notes which during the last two years have appeared in print concerning this reputed South American enigma. There is, perhaps, one valid reason for the present article: in the plethora of reflections, studies, and editorials one angle has not been often considered, the attitude of the Catholic Church towards the dictatorial government which began with the revolution of June 4, 1943.

Catholic Background

In order to better appreciate the facts, a little background may be helpful. As is well known, Argentina is a Catholic country and all its background is Catholic. From the very beginning of the independence of what was then called the United Provinces of La Plata, its patriots and early leaders were more than ordinarily respectful towards the Church. Some of them—Castelli, Saavedra, Belgrona—had been devotees of the House of Retreats in Buenos Aires; the greater part of them in times of national crisis invoked the aid of Our Lady of Luján or made pilgrimages to her shrine. This is the national shrine of Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina which is housed in the great modern basilica of the town of Luján about fifty miles west of Buenos Aires. There is a painting here of Bartolomé Mitre, Argentine President and national historian, kneeling devoutly before the shrine of the Virgin. The earliest constitutions made very clear the solidity of Argentina's Catholicism. For instance, the document of 1819 has the following: "The Government owes to religion the most efficacious and powerful protection, and the inhabitants of all the territory respect it, whatever might be their private opinions." Dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas in the 1830's and 1840's allied himself with the Church, used it to consolidate his dictatorship, and then tyrannized over it. The constitution of 1853, which is still official, declared that "the Federal Government supports the Roman Catholic religion." This constitution brought about the union of Church and State which still exists. It declared that the national treasury would defray the expenses necessary for the maintenance of Catholic worship; that the nation would exercise the right of patronage over the Church; that the Government had the right to intervene in Church matters, especially when these affected the social order.

From these and other stipulations added later it can be seen how closely the government, officially, was united to the Church. Indeed, the union was too close to suit many churchmen, for it meant the continuance of the colonial *Patronato Real* which in the national regimes of Latin America the Papacy and the Episcopacy never officially recognized. A president such as the able and far-seeing Rivadavia considered that according to the spirit of the earlier constitutions he could intervene even in ecclesiastical or religious matters. Thus with the consent of Congress he proceeded to reform a clergy

which had lapsed into corruption. He fixed the number (minimum of fifteen, maximum of thirty) of members of religious communities, set twenty-five as the youngest age of entrance into religion, and suppressed certain orders, confiscating their property to the State. All this seemed very natural to Argentine statesmen of the age. For a long time there had been no contact with Rome due to world troubles, and the church in Argentina was the nation's to govern and to purify. None of these men considered such measures as persecution, but only as reformation and purification. Although certain types of churchmen strenuously and even fanatically resisted such measures, other churchmen (as was the case likewise in Brazil) considered them as normal, useful, and even necessary for the well-being of both Church and State. The celebrated Argentine churchman, Dr. Gregorio Funes of Córdoba, referred to generally as Dean Funes, presided over the national assembly which made the constitution of 1819. Nine other clerics were members of this convention. These men accepted quite naturally the "regalism" which had been the practice of kings during the preceding centuries in Europe as well as in America. They considered the right of patronage as "inherent in national sovereignty," a position which the Holy See has never conceded.

Argentina has been spared the more exacerbated political and religious conflicts which have caused so much trouble and been so destructive in many Latin American countries. This, however, does not mean that she has been spared all such internal disagreements. In the 1860's and again in the 1890's there were quarrels with the Holy See. In the latter dispute the Government, having shifted to another regime, realized it had gone too far in the matter of the *patronato* and diplomatically receded from its too advanced position. Since this dispute, settled during the incumbency of President Luís Saénz Peña, the practice has been the following: When a vacancy among the hierarchy occurs the Argentine Senate sends three names to the President of the republic. He in turn fixes upon the name desired and sends it on to Rome. The Pope may make this appointment or send the name back to be replaced by another more acceptable to himself. The Papacy, not wishing to displease the Argentine Government, has usually accepted the first name sent. An exception occurred in 1923 when the candidate chosen by the Argentine Government was that of Monseñor Miguel de Andrea, a greatly beloved prelate and one of the most eminent church men in South America. It was he who in 1942 visited the United States in company with other prominent Latin American leaders. For reasons and manipulations too long to explain here his candidacy for the Archbishopric of Buenos Aires was rejected by Pope Pius XI. The Government refused to make another nomination and for two years relations between the Vatican and Argentina were strained. Finally, late in 1926 President Alvear suggested the name of Monseñor Fray Bottaro, and this candidate was accepted by the Holy See.

Hence it becomes apparent how Catholic is the background of Argentina. Since 1935, the Archbishop of Buenos Aires has been Cardinal Santiago Luis Copello, and he together with other members of the hierarchy are always present at the public functions of state; in these and other gatherings the absence of the hierarchy would be considered a disadvantageous and an improper deficiency. On the feast of St. Rose of Lima, a national holiday, the thoroughfares are thronged with humanity eager to witness the great church processions. The internationally prominent *Academia Nacional de la Historia* pays a fee each year for a solemn Mass in the cathedral for the spiritual benefit of its deceased members. In this noble fabric, which faces the central plaza of Buenos Aires, San Martín, the George Washington of southern South America, has his honored tomb and shrine. A guard of two soldiers stands here constantly at attention.

Again, this does not affirm that all Argentines are what we call in the United States practicing Catholics. In this the nation partakes of the general character and condition of practically all of Latin America. The leaders usually are proud of their Catholicism and as a rule, are sincerely loyal to it especially when compared with North American Protestantism. But indifference is widespread and there are few who live up to the essential practices of their faith, especially among the men. In this matter, the most acceptable figures for the nation are that out of a population of approximately thirteen million only thirteen per cent attend Mass on Sunday and approach the Sacraments annually. Of this thirteen per cent the men again form only about eight or ten per cent. But the prominent social weddings, of course, always take place in church and entree into the upper social brackets is facilitated by one's Catholic faith. Less perhaps than in other Latin American countries, the knowledge that a foreign representative of a government or a big business firm is a Catholic, facilitates his contacts.

The Revolution: 1930

With this background it becomes easier to understand the relation between the Church and the Government in the revolution of June, 1943, and during the years that followed. Let us build some background for that revolution.

During the presidency of Roque Sáenz Peña (1910-1916) the electoral laws were modified, and this by two provisions: voting was henceforth to be done by secret ballot, and it was to be obligatory. Because of this reform, the following elections of 1916 were the most honest and the most representative of any held theretofore in the republic. The leader of the Radical Party (radical in Latin politics really means liberal), Hipólito Irigoyen (1916-1922), was elected by the largest ballot ever cast in the history of Argentina. During his six year term of office Irigoyen endeavored to bring about various liberal reforms of an economic nature, benefiting the working man and the lower classes of society. Irigoyen's successor was another member of the same radical (liberal) party, Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear (1922-1928). At the end of this regime Irigoyen was

again elected by another record-breaking representation at the polls. His six year regime was to end in 1934—had his second regime not been so disappointing. The world-wide economic depression beginning in 1929 hit Argentina together with all the other Latin American republics; economic conditions were bad and labor became more discontented, internal corruption became augmented, and the President began to govern with a dictatorial hand. It was then that occurred the revolution of 1930 which overthrew the Irigoyen regime and induced avowed dictatorship.

The revolution followed familiar lines in Latin American history. It was the army that did it. General José Evaristo Uriburu, nephew of a former president, with the understanding of his colleagues, marched a detachment of troops into Buenos Aires from Campo Mayo (a garrison of the suburbs) early on the morning of September 6, 1930. There was nothing to it. The troops entered without opposition the *Casa Rosada*, (sort of Argentine White House), took over the postoffice and other public buildings and the revolution was accomplished. The only bloodshed occurred when shots were exchanged (by mistake) between the *Casa Rosada* and the postoffice. Some rioting was indulged in, chiefly by hoodlums and by some students of the University of Buenos Aires.

General Uriburu set out to purge the administration of the graft with which it had become permeated. He was backed strongly by the conservative elements, important among these being the wealthy landowners and the Church (this means a majority of the hierarchy and many of the clergy). The adherence of the former is obvious: Many army officers have sprung from the old landed gentry, those who own the broad acres called *estancias* in Argentina. General Uriburu promised a return to democratic forms of government as soon as he had cleaned up the administration. He kept his promise. Elections were held November 8, 1931, and General Agustín Justo was elected president for the constitutional six year term.

Now democracy again had its chance in Argentina. It endured a little more than eleven years. President Justo assumed the active executive in February, 1932. He promised a conservative regime. But the Radicals attempted a *coup d'état*, so the President declared a "state of siege" which constitutionally gave him dictatorial powers. Irigoyen died in May, 1933, and there were scattered attempts at revolution followed by another declaration of a "state of siege." In September, 1937, Roberto Ortiz, of the Conservative-Liberal groups and a friend of democracy and of the United States, was chosen as President. "The elections were quiet, with only three persons killed and a few wounded." Inaugurated in February, 1938, his regime constitutionally should have ended only in 1944. But World War II was shaping up in Europe; President Ortiz became ill and resigned (July 3, 1940), and Vice-President Castillo assumed the executive duties. But the (often factious) parliamentary tactics of the opposition parties blocked all measures which the Government tried to adopt, so that all legislation and active government were frus-

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EDITORIALS

In a Moment of National Sorrow

THE HISTORICAL BULLETIN deeply regrets that it must record the passing of a great American. Historians, of all people, know that it is much too soon to pass a definitive judgment on the man and his work. However, whether or not the verdict of time and perspective ranges Franklin Delano Roosevelt among our outstanding presidents and ranks him among the great world figures of all time, there is one thing which we can assert without waiting: He was a great American. Franklin Delano Roosevelt stood for those things which have made the United States a powerful and a respected nation: devotion to human rights and a reverence for and a belief in God, who gave those human rights and, in His wisdom, provided for political society and government that they might be preserved. May that God reward him!

The death of the late President, though we all knew that it must come at some time or other, shocks us in this moment of strain and stress and crisis. Our sentiments are varied. Sorrow vies with anxiety; distress with an ill-defined apprehension. This is but natural under the first impact of the tremendous news. That first moment passed, however, we must turn our thoughts into channels more logical and considered.

Without in any wise meaning it in a spirit of disrespect or petty partisanship, we must know that the United States is greater, is bigger than any one of its citizens, no matter how seemingly indispensable, no matter how important that individual might have been. Our destiny is not circumscribed by a personality. Great men may influence it, but they do not make it and have not made it in the past. Ours is a nation which the people have made, by their industry, by their sacrifices, by their faith. And it will be ever thus, as long as those virtues live in hearts and show forth in the lives of Americans.

These times demand superior leadership, you say. What times do not? We must be realists and, again without disrespect, affirm our faith in the United States. Our late President had no monopoly on the qualities

of American leadership—no matter to what high degree he may have possessed these attributes. If our nation can produce only one man to meet a crisis, then we, as a nation, have no justification for continuing in business. But that situation does not exist. We have leaders. We cannot help having them. In the first place, we can firmly believe that God has not sold us short in that regard. Again, we know better, for ours is a land where men are free to develop God-given talents. Leadership is not the prerogative of a class or a state or a section. It exists all about us, waiting only for a chance to be put to work. At times the very brilliance, native or contrived, of one man may tend to push others quite as capable or more so into the shadow and cause them to be forgotten, until the spotlights are dimmed and all the stage lights again are illumined.

It is a time for faith, a time for sportsmanship, a time for cooperation. It is a time, too, to recall that some of our best presidents have not always been, to appearances at least, our most brilliant men. If American administrators could but learn the magnificent lesson of George Washington, we should have nothing to fear. Washington was a big man because he realized how small he was personally and called to stand by his side and to work with him others who had qualifications which he knew himself to lack. And his task was tremendous, launching a new nation, not merely that of keeping a young and vigorous one moving ahead, granted that the course must be charted through troubled and treacherous seas. The fact that our present chief executive has not been headlined into prominence over a great number of years argues to precisely nothing as regards his abilities or his qualifications. American sportsmanship must give him a chance.

This writer is still, as some might say, old-fashioned enough to believe that a paternal and provident Creator rules the destinies of both men and nations and that His decrees, while often inscrutable and puzzling, yet in the end add up to good. There is no reason to think that He has forgotten our United States.

And one more thought! It has often been asserted

that the most American section of these United States is the Middle West. Our times would seem to need the clear thinking of the frontiersman, his dauntless courage, his boundless faith in our nation's destiny and greatness, his ability to divorce himself and to see things from a broad perspective, untrammelled by the proximity of non-American elements of sympathy and culture and trade and a thousand more. May God grant that the virtues of the frontier are not dead!

J. F. B.

The People and Peace

Ivory towers were once regarded as standard equipment for the professor and scholar. The advent of total war has made more than one man doubt the fitness of such a dwelling. As individuals whom others support for the work of education, they have taken counsel with themselves to judge whether a hermit-like existence, remote from the present scene, entitles them to such support. Have their educational practices been to a true effect?

For many reasons the Catholic teacher or writer of history is obliged to a realistic course of action. In common with other institutions of learning, Catholic schools and Catholic educators may ask themselves how heavily does the stricture of Aristotle lie upon their shoulders: "Of all the things which I have mentioned that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected." Have our educational aims been rightly directed to train for the type of world in which we live? Specifically, as historians have we been content with exposing the events of the past to give our students a knowledge of what other ages have done, without indicating present possibilities or necessities, without arousing interest in the action of our times? We believe that failure in this regard is a serious matter. It is serious not only because we may some day be dispossessed of our ivory shelters by a results-seeking world, but because this effort is a subject of higher obligation.

Let us examine an instance of current event in which the historian must take an interest. In October, 1943, a joint *Declaration on World Peace* was issued over the signatures of leading members of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish communities. Outlining the "minimum requirements of a peace," the fifth point declares that "international institutions to maintain peace with justice must be organized." Immediately the N.C.W.C. began a splendid campaign of popular education in this Pattern for Peace. Here was an excellent instance of a contemporary event of true historical import, which deserved attention for its own sake, and as an opportunity for educating men in the American way. Could not the history class consider the historical process by which such a joint action came about in this country? And could not the class in political science or civics consider the significance of such a public statement of policy?

But personal responsibility and a demand for active interest is not limited to the writer or teacher of history. When the proposals for the establishment of a General International Organization, drawn up at Dumbarton

Oaks, were released by the State Department on October 9, 1944, the opportunity was provided for a frank discussion, by interested parties, of the means to be employed in guaranteeing future peace. The State Department expressed itself as desirous of hearing the criticism of any group among the people. Indeed, shortly thereafter the annual Conference of the Catholic Hierarchy of the United States passed a series of resolutions on the Proposals. This statement was greeted with applause by other similar group and by many prominent legislators.

Aside from this practical invitation to the layman to interest himself in, and to become vocal on the means of securing a lasting peace, there is a more serious obligation. This finds its foundation in more than the new-born exigencies of a war-stricken world, in more than the wishes of a federal department and the example of representative bodies. Aristotle's evaluation of education as a necessity for a stable political order makes it each citizen's obligation to follow the momentous events taking place around him. The high seriousness of this obligation has been newly demonstrated by the Papal Christmas Message of 1944. Commenting on the widespread cry for democracy and better democracy, Pius XII maintains that this demand can have no other meaning than, "to place the citizen ever more in the position to hold his own personal opinion, to express it and to make it prevail in a fashion conducive to common good." Obviously, such an action calls for a background of self-education. With it, the Pontiff has high hope that if leaders fail, at least the people, "stirred by the war to their innermost depths," may prevail "to avoid for the future the repetition of such a catastrophe."

Moreover, it is an obligation incumbent on us all with the force of a "moral imperative," to use the phrase of a distinguished modern theologian, who has written on the necessity of establishing an international organization, as "an inescapable demand of social justice, a true and genuine moral imperative, laid upon the collective conscience of States and peoples by the moral law and sanctioned by the sovereignty of God."

History tells us plainly enough that current efforts for peace, on the part of national leaders, are of an extraordinary nature. In view of this the individual must not only seek to aid by constructive criticism, but must desist from a defeatist attitude, which has been diagnosed by Dr. Waldemar Gurian as a form of "perfectionist nihilism." Here, once more, the historian finds ample scope for his labor. Can he not provide an experimental proof of the declaration of Pope Pius XII, that "in its ultimate and deepest significance, peace is a moral and juridical process?"

In addition to this interest, nations and individuals must be prepared for sacrifice in the establishment of the necessary organization. They must be convinced of an eminently Christian truth, that justice can and will prevail here only through the reasonable efforts of all men. In this endeavor there is need for a spirit of hopefulness, which a true study of history should engender. This is the intent of Archbishop Griffin (successor to Cardinal Hinsley in the See of Westminster) in his recent address to the Anglo-Polish Catholic Association.

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The Weimar Constitution

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AS the news from the European front becomes increasingly better, thoughtful Americans will be asking themselves what kind of government the German people will adopt for their country. No one doubts that the system with which Germany has been saddled for the past twelve years must go. Will a democratic form of government take its place? Since most Americans, perhaps, take it for granted that the German people will turn to some form of democratic government, it is well worth our while to recall the main elements of their former government under the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. Any attempt at a return to democracy necessitates a reconsideration of that famous document, if only as a precaution for avoiding serious mistakes in the future. The Weimar Constitution had many strong points; someone is supposed to have said that it was too perfect to work. The following considerations are offered with this fact in mind, that the German people in forming a new government will most certainly turn to this document. It may be helpful to refresh our memory of it. Hence, this short article.

The conditions of the times and the burden of reparations with which the new German government was saddled, were not the only difficulties under which the Weimar Constitution was launched. The fact that the constitution "reflected the spirit of compromise and dissension rather than a great common impulse,"¹ indicates that it was in for a stormy history. There is some justification for saying that the Weimar Constitution was doomed to failure in achieving that which a constitution is supposed to achieve, namely, security. Herman Finer points out that a constitution is a system of fundamental political institutions established by men because of their desire to reduce uncertainty to a minimum.² Who will defend, then, the proposition that Germany under this constitution was able to reduce uncertainty to a minimum? It would be most unfair to blame the evils that befell Germany in the late twenties and early thirties entirely on the constitution; but it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that many of these evils were at least occasioned by the weaknesses of the instrument of government. Who knows what good results might have been achieved if the authors of the constitution had not been frightened by their own courage?³ For, in the supposition that they were frightened by their own courage, one can detect how they cancelled many of the wise provisions of the constitution, and unwittingly set the stage for what has been called "Presidential Government" or "Government by Emergency Decree,"—the door through which the dictator entered upon the German scene.

A Federal or a Unitary State

The perennial problem of how much sovereignty

should be given to the states which were being drawn into the federal union, hounded Hugo Preuss, the author of the Weimar Constitution. With great difficulty he fought to maintain the unitary principle. But the pressure on the part of the Prussians and the Bavarians was so strong that Preuss and his party had to submit a compromise. This compromise was so ingenious that, as Brunte remarks, the German jurists who have attempted to answer the questions whether the Reich is a federal state or a single state are almost equally divided in their answers.⁴ And Finer says, in the same vein, that the constitution which was finally approved saw "the creation of a federal state of such a high degree of unity that constitutional lawyers and political scientists find it difficult to supply it with a satisfactory name."⁵

Such remarks lead one to uphold the thesis that the failure to establish the unitary principle as solidly as Preuss wanted it established, was responsible for furnishing a loophole to those who wanted to peck away at the constitution and embarrass those who tried to govern the country according to its principles. The compromise was far from settling the question, and agitation for a greater degree of federalism increased instead of declining. This agitation developed into a move to amend the constitution—a move that culminated in the *Memorandum on the Revision of the Weimar Constitution* which the Bavarian government submitted to the central government.

This memorandum summarizes the question very well, and reads in part:

Statehood of the "Lands" is not synonymous with national impotency; on the contrary, the German national state is only possible through the concentration of the historically founded German member-states, and on the basis of their constitutional and cultural existence. The true exponent of Germanism is not a unitary state composed of individuals, but the multitude of the constitutional and national organisms as, and in so far as, they have been preserved in the German federated state. In the unitarism of the Weimar Constitution the idea of the national state exceeds the optimum on unification and concentration to its detriment. The unitaristic centralization of the Weimar Constitution does not do justice to the historic German idea of the national state which is based on and emanates from the strong dynamic self-consciousness of the member-states toward the whole.⁶

Failure, then, to establish firmly either a unitary or a federal state set the stage for much of the carping which eventually took place and weakened the Weimar Constitution as an instrument of government. Herbert Kraus, Professor of International and Public Law and Political Science at the University of Königsberg, describes the constitution as "rather patched," and goes on to

... call attention to the fact that this constitution, as the product of a strongly divergent parliamentary coalition majority, is to a great extent a political party compromise . . . (and as such) from a political point of view it appears in certain parts very disconnected and imperfect. Only too often its regulations, balanced between yes and no, have stuck in the middle, and indicate a compromise between right and left.⁷

¹ Marx, F. M., *Government in the Third Reich*, p. 33.

² Finer, Herman, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, p. 181.

³ Kraus, H., *Germany in Transition*, p. 165.

⁴ Brunet, R., *The New German Constitution*, p. 71.

⁵ Finer, *op cit.*, p. 354. ⁶ Kraus, *op. cit.*, pp. 213 f.

⁷ Kraus, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 f.

Article 12 of the Constitution seems to furnish some basis for Professor Kraus' statement. The article reads as follows:

As long as, and in so far as, the Reich does not make use of its powers of legislation, the states shall retain the power of legislation. This does not apply to the power of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Reich (i. e. power over these items listed under Article 6).⁸

Here the constitution leans towards the states, but fearing lest any real power be lost, the same article immediately adds in the second paragraph that:

The National Ministry shall have the right to veto laws of the states which relate to matters covered by Article 7, subsection 13, in so far as the welfare of the people of the Reich is thereby affected.⁹

This fundamental conflict between the parties is further brought out in articles 8 and 11. The latter establishes the right of the Reich to prescribe fundamental principles by law with respect to the imposition and collection of state taxes in order to safeguard important taxation and prejudice to the national revenues or the commercial relations of the Reich.¹⁰

In reading the articles regulating the relations between the Reich and the states (Articles 1 to 19), one cannot help seeing that the men responsible for this constitution begrudged almost every concession made to the *lander*; and, as a result, they endeavored so to fence in the concessions which were demanded that the supremacy of the central government would be obvious—a good example of what Professor Kraus means when he states that the regulations of the constitution are balanced between yes and no.

The Reichstag

The position of the Reichstag in the new German government is provided for with reassuring firmness and directness. The confusion which can hardly be avoided on the reading of section 1, chapter 1 of the Weimar Constitution is not experienced when one reads section 11 of the same chapter. For in this chapter, the constitution speaks clearly and with force, defining the part the Reichstag is to play in the new government. Professor Kraus must be quoted once again, for he admirably sums up the work of the authors of the Weimar Constitution in their provisions for a representative body.

Only in one point is its (the constitution's) purpose quite clear. We are struck by the apprehension that the influence and position of the Reichstag as heart and central organ of the constitutional machine might not be sufficiently guaranteed. Consequently, the position of the Reichstag is established in the constitution with the greatest emphasis and care.¹¹

All in all, the Weimar Constitution is built around the Reichstag. When the constitution comes to deal with the President, it is evident how jealous the authors of the constitution were in guarding the prerogatives of the representative body. The same is true in the articles dealing with the Cabinet. Fritz Marx summarizes it well when he says:

Undoubtedly, the Reich presidency, as the framers of the Weimar Constitution conceived it in the turbulent spring and summer of 1919, was not intentionally designed to meet the need of com-

petent direction inherent in modern industrial organization. The ruler was the Reichstag. Here lay the political center of gravity.¹²

Ogg in his chapter on parliamentary institutions, uses a figure which very aptly describes the position of the Reichstag in the new German government. In the use of the figure he includes, very significantly, a parenthetical remark which is indicative of the fate of the Weimar Constitution in actual operation. Of the Reichstag, Ogg says:

From being tolerated as a 'fifth-wheel,' the Reichstag became (at all events was expected to become) a flywheel, to which the entire mechanism of government was geared, and by which it was to be kept in balance.¹³

It would be well to see from the constitution itself some of the propositions which give the Reichstag its great powers. For example, the Reichstag can demand that it be convened; article 24 provides that the president of the Reichstag must call the body together at an earlier date than the one set down, "if the President of the Reich or at least one-third of the deputies of the Reichstag demand it." Furthermore, it is within the competence of that body to determine the date of the close of its session as well as the date of its re-assembly.¹⁴

The anxiety of the author of this constitution, namely, that the Reichstag should enjoy an important position, is even more in evidence in article 35. This article prescribes that the Reichstag shall appoint a standing committee on foreign affairs. This standing committee, moreover, is to have the power to act between sessions as well as after the dissolution of the Reichstag and the convening of a new one. Then, lest the Cabinet system grow too powerful, another standing committee is to be appointed for the protection of the rights of the representative body over the National Ministry, for the period between sessions and after the close of a legislative turn.¹⁵ Brunet remarks that when this article was up for discussion during the considerations preceding the acceptance of the constitution, the committee of "surveillance," as it was called, was vigorously opposed. But those who advocated the retention of this article held that this committee would correspond fully in character to the Reichstag as an organ of control, and would be consistent with the confidence and the good will on which the cabinet depends.¹⁶ The domination of the Reichstag is more firmly established over the Cabinet by article 54. This article states that the Chancellor and national ministers must have the confidence of the Reichstag for the exercise of their offices, and any one of those mentioned must resign if the Reichstag withdraws its confidence by express resolution. Moreover, according to article 56, the Chancellor is responsible for the policy which he lays down to the Reichstag. And lest there be any loop-holes, each minister is given the task of independently conducting the branch of administration intrusted to him, and is made personally responsible to the Reichstag.¹⁷

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¹² Marx, F. M., *op. cit.*, p. 58.

¹³ Ogg, F. A., *European Governments and Politics*, p. 653.

¹⁴ McBain, H. L., *op. cit.*, p. 181. ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁶ Brunet, R. *op. cit.*, p. 152. ¹⁷ McBain, H. L. *op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁸ McBain, H. L., *The New Constitutions of Europe*, p. 179.

⁹ *Ibid.* ¹⁰ *Ibid.* ¹¹ Kraus, H., *op. cit.*, p. 166.

Russia and World Peace

(Continued from page seventy-six)

lations between naive optimism and cynical despair—both equally fatal to the welfare of mankind. Thus, in time of war, under the influence of certain slogans they begin by believing literally and without question that the victorious conclusion of the war will mean the perpetual banishment of war from society, the liberation of all colonial peoples, the emancipation of all the victims of exploitation (except the victims of their own exploitation) the establishment of the reign of perpetual justice. Then, when the discrepancies between the ideal and the real emerge, they end by taking refuge in angry or cynical despair: the war was a fraud, the slogans were snares and illusions, there is no hope for the future; let us crawl back into our cave of isolation and let the rest of the world go to perdition.

This is equivalent to saying that we must abandon the world entirely to evil because we cannot establish the uncontested reign of unmitigated good. It is hardly necessary to point out that if Christianity had accepted this moral point of view—which is really an amoral point of view—she would have given up her mission in the world before even embarking upon it. Her struggle with evil is carried out not only on a world level but on the level of every individual soul. In how many souls does she succeed in establishing the rule of uncontested good?

The fact that evil exists on so large a scale in human nature inevitably means that in striving to advance the cause of good we are often confronted with the necessity of choosing between the lesser of two evils. It is true that this necessity can be invoked where it does not actually exist and thus lead to a deplorable moral betrayal of integral Christianity. This is a crime often committed by Christians. It is the crime of those Christians who were ready to embrace Naziism or Fascism upon the ground they were lesser evils than Communism. It was the crime of certain Americans who in 1937 were ready to defend the unspeakable horrors of Japanese aggression against China upon the theory that the Japanese were attacking Communism.

2) There is the confused notion that the several United Nations entered upon this struggle in behalf of small nations. It is frequently said, for example, that Great Britain went to war in defense of Poland. Consequently, when Great Britain finds herself forced to accept Russian demands vis-à-vis Poland she is charged with having hypocritically rendered her entire cause meaningless.

The simple fact is that neither Great Britain, nor Soviet Russia, nor the United States went to war out of an altruistic conception of a high moral obligation to defend the victims of aggression. Nations never go to war for such high purposes. When they do go to war for such purposes, and only for such purposes, we shall have a much better world. But it is again dangerous unrealism to confuse that kind of world with the kind of world we actually live in. It is equally dangerous to assume that in this respect the United States moves on a higher level of moral integrity than do the other powers. Great Britain, the Soviet Union,

and the United States went to war to defend themselves against threatened aggression. If Great Britain had gone to war to defend smaller nations against aggression, why did she not go to war in defense of Austria, or of Czechoslovakia? She went to war when Poland was attacked because at long last not even the wishful Chamberlain could any longer blind himself to the fact that Hitler was leading Germany on a career of aggression which, unless forcibly stopped, would not terminate short of the domination of the entire continent. And British statesmen and the British people have always understood that when any military power was able to establish its domination of the continent the days of the British empire and even of an independent England were numbered. The defense of Poland was incidental to the defense of Britain.

Before Americans indulge too freely in an ancient American habit of castigating the British Empire for its cynicism they should be reminded that the United States entered the war for no higher motives. If we were motivated by the defense of innocent victims of aggression, we should have been at war in 1939 in defense of Poland. We entered the war only when bombs dropped from the skies upon Pearl Harbor.

The same is true of the USSR. It was brought into the war when Nazi armies poured across its frontier.

The obvious conclusion, but a conclusion the obviousness of which seems to have escaped the notice of many people, is that the only completely common objective uniting the Allies was that they were all engaged in a war of self-defense against a common aggressor. Beyond that there existed no community of objectives. It should surprise nobody, therefore, that, as victory looms in sight, the latent differences in secondary objectives between the Allies begin to emerge. It is only surprising, and for this we should be grateful, that thus far at any rate they have not been greater than in fact they are. That this is so must be credited to the statesmanship of the leaders of the Allied nations.

Does this mean that the Atlantic Charter was but a bit of rhetorical hypocrisy designed to camouflage the real motives which had brought us into war? The enunciation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter is not mere hypocrisy. These principles set forth the general ideals of the better, though not perfect, world, which we hope we shall be able to build when we shall have won this war in which the interests of our own defense have engaged us. They give expression to an effort to sublimate a war of self-defense to a higher dedication.

It is legitimate to deprecate violations of the ideals of the Atlantic Charter in the peace settlement. It is legitimate to make every effort, within the limits of the attainable, to extend the application of those ideals as far as possible in an imperfect world. It is legitimate to strive unceasingly to narrow the distance that separates the world from the realization of perfect justice. It is not legitimate to withdraw from participation in international collaboration upon the ground that in this or that respect the peace settlement has sacrificed justice to power interests. This is the perfectionist nihilism which is an abandonment of all hope.

3) There is the assumption *trop simpliste* that the

demands of justice in the realm of international relations are always perfectly plain and that there can be no conflict between these demands. This is far from the case. To take one instance: Can it be demonstrated that the right of self-determination of peoples is a primary right of justice? If it can, then has that right no limits? What of the case where the very existence and independence of the people of a large nation can be exposed to real danger by the claim of a smaller people to self-determine themselves? Suppose the people of Hawaii laid claim to independence. To recognize their right to independence would, in the modern world, expose the United States to a great strategic danger. Does the theoretical right of Hawaiians to self-determination take precedence over the right of the United States to self-preservation? Is there anything *in the nature of things* which says that a different standard of values should apply in the case of Hawaii than in the case of Esthonia? Those who maintain that the right of self-determination is a primary right of justice which automatically sets aside all conflicting claims must be consistent. Usually they are not. I have yet to hear any of those who regard the world lost and justice utterly betrayed by Russia's absorption of the Baltic States take the platform in behalf of Basque independence. Why not? Who are the Basques? They are not Spaniards, either by blood or by language. They have long demanded the right to self-determine themselves. They recently shed considerable blood in defense of that right which Franco refused to recognize. What makes the case of the Basques different from that of the Latvians? The fact that the Basques have for some hundreds of years been subjected to Spanish rule? Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania were part of the Russian Empire from the time of Peter the Great until less than three decades ago—before that they were part of the Swedish Empire. What of the Catalonians, who speak a language (the use of which Franco is at the present attempting to forbid them) closer to French than to Spanish and who have long demanded the right of self-determination? What of the Ukrainians and other nationality groups east of the Curzon Line who were not asked by Poland in 1921 any more than they are being asked by Russia today whether they desired independence or not? What of the people of India, of Burma, of Indo-China, of the Dutch East Indies? And, if I have not mis-read history, I seem to recall that this nation engaged in a bloody struggle, within the memory of a few men still living, in denial of the right of the people of the South to self-determination.

Nothing that has been written here is intended as an apology for Russian policy. Its purpose is to indicate that the simplified view of questions of principle, the affirmation of which is easier than the application, cannot be sustained. It contributes nothing to the cause of world stability or to the general advance of justice to overlook this fact. It contributes nothing, furthermore, to cry scandal at Russian violations of a principle, while blandly ignoring the fact that the same principle has been and is similarly violated by other major powers. The fact is that the principle of self-determination can never be universally applied except in a world in which

all nations are organized under a world-government which is capable of guaranteeing justice to all as well as security to all. And even then there will exist areas where the principle cannot be perfectly applied.

Russia in the Post-War World

Now let us in a summary fashion examine the question of Soviet Russia and world peace. It is of the utmost importance to the future that men everywhere endeavor to form as sound a judgment as possible in this matter. This means that emotionalism, passion, and prejudice must be cast aside. The primary concern of every man of good-will should be to exploit to the full every possibility which offers hope of establishing a lasting peace. This does not mean that he naively blind himself to the dangerous possibilities which the greatly increased power of the USSR holds for the world. On the contrary, it imposes upon him the necessity of weighing well those possibilities and doing everything possible to off-set them by bringing Soviet Russia into a framework of mutual cooperation which offers the hope of diminishing in time the distance that separates Russia from the other nations of the world. Pamphleteers who have nothing better to offer than fierce diatribes against "bloody-handed" Joe Stalin, the "Asiatic atheist" (an expression, by the way, whose overtones are an insult to every Oriental) are not making any positive contribution to a better world.

The situation with respect to the USSR is one which does not permit of great optimism; neither does it demand black pessimism. It allows only of a certain sober hope. The future is fraught with perils, but it is not necessary to despair. That is about the best that can be said about it. That, in sum, is the way Winston Churchill recently described it to the House of Commons.

What are the facts with regard to the Soviet Union and the world situation? The most important fact is that the Soviet Union will emerge from this war as the strongest single power on the European continent. She will therefore be in a position to wield greater influence in Europe than at any time in the past.

To what ends will Russia use her power in the post-war world? The future peace of the world largely hinges upon the answer to that question. There are those who seem to be certain in their own minds that Russia will use her power to impose Communist regimes upon all the countries of western Europe and ultimately upon all the countries of the world. They refuse to admit the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union. They reject almost with scorn the suggestion that Stalin may have any objective other than world revolution. These people who seem so sure of themselves should at least be logically consistent. If they are so confident of their own judgments, then they should logically demand that we commit ourselves here and now to a policy of war with the Soviet Union. They are saying in effect that war with the USSR is inevitable; that the Soviet Union has supplanted Nazi Germany as world aggressor; that any concessions to the Soviet Union only strengthen her position; that she can only be stopped by force; that if she is not stopped now she cannot be stopped later. If these propositions are correct the only sensible conclusion is to advocate war.

The self-appointed prophets of despair shrink, however, from committing themselves explicitly to this conclusion. Possibly they sense, if they will not admit, that the people of the United States, much less the people of Great Britain, will not support a war with the Soviet Union which could be prosecuted only at the cost of immense sacrifices compared to which the sacrifices thus far borne by the people of these two nations would pale into insignificance. It would be a long, bloody, exhausting, and probably inconclusive war which would create such mass despair and cynicism as to make the triumph of Communism inevitable in the end.

Without yielding to false optimism it is not necessary to follow the despairing prophets. Russian policy, like the policy of any nation, must be analyzed rationally, not emotionally. The difficulty is that certain minds have become as incapable of analyzing Russian policy rationally as certain other minds (sometimes they are the same minds) have always been of analyzing British policy rationally. And these anti-Russian emotional prejudices can be as dangerous to world peace as anti-British prejudices have sometimes proved. It cannot be denied that the anti-League of Nations sentiment in this country was to a large extent compounded of anti-British prejudice.

There are many reasons to think that the primary objective of Russian policy after this war will not be either European conquest or world revolution, but will be instead concerned with military and political security for the Soviet Union.

Stalin's Political Aims

One cannot naively ignore the entire political history of the Soviet regime in Russia in assessing policy. Unless one thinks that the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, the most important and significant episode since the death of Lenin, was a pleasant comedy, one must admit that the central issues around which that struggle revolved were of fundamental importance in the thinking of the two antagonists. That struggle centered around the question of whether or not it was possible to build Socialism in one country as long as the other major nations remained non-Socialist and whether, therefore, the revolution in Russia should concentrate its energies upon the task of building Socialism at home or upon the task of promoting revolutions abroad. Stalin won that struggle and from 1927 to 1940 concentrated his efforts upon building Socialism in the USSR. The cause of world revolution was thrust into the background and wholly subordinated to the primary task as conceived by Stalin. The Third International, originally intended as the instrument for promoting world revolution, was made simply an instrument of Russian foreign policy. The principal objective of Russian foreign policy became the securing of Russia against the threat of attack, because Stalin knew that the achieving of Socialism in Russia required above everything else that Russia be left alone and unmolested. He knew that an attack upon Russia during the years of Socialist construction could prove fatal to the realization of his ambitions. Consequently, security—and hence peace—became the main objective of Russian foreign policy. It is difficult for

the Russophobe to admit this because of his unwillingness to admit that Soviet leaders, even for pragmatic purposes, can have any but destructive aims. But Russian policy cannot be otherwise understood. That policy, once its objective is understood, was entirely consistent throughout the pre-war years, contrary to what many have believed. Tactics changed as the international situation of the moment demanded, but the ultimate objective was always the same—security from attack.

During the 1920's the chief threat to Russia was conceived to lie in the hostility of the most powerful capitalist countries of the West. The animosity of Great Britain was not disguised. The United States steadily refused even to recognize the Soviet Union. As security against the hostile combination of capitalist Democracies, Soviet policy throughout the 1920's was directed towards the establishment of friendly relations with Germany.

When the fascist menace assumed sinister proportions with the rise of Hitler in Germany, Russian policy prepared itself to revise its direction. Efforts were made to establish better relations with the western democracies. Litvinov sought and obtained recognition by the United States. He took the Soviet Union into the League of Nations. Once it became apparent that the hope, which Stalin had for a time shared with western statesmen, that Hitler was a passing curiosity whose regime would quickly be overthrown by the German people was an illusion, the Soviet Union became the strongest and most outspoken advocate of cooperative action with the western democracies against Fascism. There is no question that from 1935 the Soviet leaders regarded Nazi-Fascism as the greatest threat to the USSR and all of their efforts were directed to building defenses against that threat. The popular front policies sponsored by communist parties throughout Europe, under the inspiration of Moscow, cannot otherwise be explained. The popular front policy contradicted one of the oldest and most firmly established doctrines of Leninism: the impossibility of cooperation with non-socialist parties.

The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 which startled the world indicated no change in Soviet objectives. It was a move perfectly consistent with that objective. Collective security as a guarantee against aggression had proved a broken reed. It was successively betrayed throughout the 1930's and the speeches of Maxim Litvinov in the assembly of the league dramatically marked each step in the process of betrayal. Munich was only the final act. Dr. Benes, who knows more than any man alive about the behind-the-scenes details of Munich, is certain that Moscow was prepared to act instantly with France and Great Britain against the Nazi threat.

The failure of France and Great Britain to act then, at the expense of Czechoslovakia, necessitated another revision of Russian tactics, but no change in ultimate objectives. The Russian leaders are logical and realistic. From Munich onward, they discarded the discredited theory of collective security; they attempted to win security through their own unilateral diplomatic and military efforts. The Nazi-Soviet pact was calculated to win time and to turn the Nazi threat to the west. The

Soviet leaders were not unaware of the fact that powerful groups in England had long hoped to avert the Nazi threat by turning it to the east. The Finnish war, however unprovoked and reprehensible it may seem, was clearly dictated by the urgently felt necessity of establishing outer defenses in regions extremely vulnerable to German aggression. When one recalls the terrible ordeal of Leningrad and the slim margin by which Moscow was saved, one must admit the soundness of Russian judgment, whatever one may think of its moral justifiability.

With the successful termination of World War II, I think it altogether reasonable to believe that Russian foreign policy will be concerned even more than formerly with establishing military and political security for the Soviet Union. The Russian people have endured greater sacrifices than any other people in this war. At least 15,000,000 Russian lives have been lost. Uncounted millions have been wounded, many of them maimed for life. In order to realize what this means one must contrast it with our own casualty lists which have cast a heavy shadow of tragedy over this country and which are yet insignificant compared to the losses sustained by the people of Russia. Every city in western Russia has been reduced to rubble. All the gigantic industrial achievements in western Russia have been virtually reduced to nothingness. In order to maintain the full fighting strength of their army the Russian people have made tremendous sacrifices on the home front. They have gone without adequate food, without adequate clothing. There has been starvation: over 1,000,000 people starved to death in Leningrad during its siege. The tremendous sacrifices of the years 1927 to 1940, when the ruthless direction of Stalin demanded of the people the utmost exertion in the interest of Socialist construction, have not been in vain—they have saved the country—but the fruits of those sacrifices have been largely wiped out by war.

In the light of these facts, which could be added to at great length, is it reasonable to suppose that Stalin has suddenly gone Trotskyite? His sudden conversion to Christianity would not be less likely. Stalin staked his entire career upon the proposition that Socialism could be established in one country, and because of his faith in that proposition he has been the object of the unrelenting hatred of Trotsky's followers ever since. Before the Nazi blow fell he had demonstrated to his own satisfaction, through the successive five year plans, that he had been right and Trotsky wrong. When his goal was in sight, the Nazi hordes poured into the country, not only interrupting the work to which Stalin had devoted his life but destroying much of the gains that had already been registered.

When this war is over the task confronting Stalin will not simply be one of resuming Socialist construction, it will be one of gigantic rebuilding. The proportions of his life task, therefore, are far greater than they were six years ago. Unless he can, within the relatively few years of leadership left to him, re-build what has been destroyed and resume again the interrupted drive of Socialist building, he will have failed to achieve within his lifetime the goal he set for himself eighteen years ago.

In these circumstances it is altogether improbable that Stalin will render meaningless everything he has done in the past eighteen years, that he will accept the Trotsky thesis and thus implicitly admit that Trotsky was right. If he succeeds in the task he set himself when he defeated Trotsky, he will have accomplished what has never before been accomplished in history. It is unlikely that Stalin, at the age of sixty-five, will jeopardize his chances of assuring himself a unique place in history in order to embark upon dubious revolutionary adventures in western Europe.

Anglo-American Responsibility

Stalin will be first of all concerned with securing the position of the USSR so that he can prosecute the task of Socialist construction without interference from abroad. To that end he will need the aid of Great Britain and especially the United States. He will, consequently, be desirous of continuing his cooperation with them. He indicated this clearly at Yalta. Those who have been most critical of the concessions made by Russia at Yalta overlook the fact that Russia need not have made any concessions. Russia held all of the cards at the Yalta conference. It is remarkable that Roosevelt and Churchill were able to win any concessions, even of a minor character. Russian armies are in occupation of eastern Europe. Do the critics of Mr. Roosevelt suggest that he should have told Stalin that, if he did not yield entirely on the Polish question, we would throw his armies out of Poland? Stalin could have replied in a phrase which the Chinese are fond of using: "*Shuo shih pien-i, tso shih nan,*" "Easier said than done."

The only possible bargaining point that Roosevelt and Churchill had was the promise of continued cooperation after the war. If Stalin set no value upon that cooperation, he could have refused any concessions. The fact that he conceded anything is a clear indication that the possibility of cooperation remains open and should be exploited to the full.

Whether the concessions made by Stalin will be effective or not is now chiefly the responsibility of the governments of Great Britain and the United States. But it is also the responsibility of the people of these two countries. It is the responsibility of the governments to see that the promises made at Yalta are loyally carried out. It is the responsibility of the people not to assume that every Russian action in eastern Europe is vicious and unjustified.

It is likely that Stalin will seek to establish the security of the USSR upon two foundations. He will seek whatever security is promised through cooperation with the western powers within the framework of a society of nations. But he will not trust entirely to this device, particularly since it has still to demonstrate its ultimate effectiveness in a world not yet prepared to accept without reservation the full implications of world solidarity. Consequently, in eastern Europe he will establish his own system of security which will consist in using the predominant position of Russia to assure that the political regimes of neighboring states have a pro-Soviet orientation. He will also insist upon the security afforded to Russia by control of the Baltic sea-coast; and, hence, will not yield on the question of the

incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. He will not buy cooperation at that price.

Stalin and World Revolution?

What of the threat of Communism in western Europe? The threat exists, but it is not a threat which is directly related to Russian policy. For the reasons indicated above it is highly improbable that the promotion of such communist revolutions will be the direct object of Russian policy. The danger of Communism is internal to the countries of western Europe and arises from social, economic, and political conditions which inevitably breed Communism. If those conditions are not remedied, if a challenging program of social, economic, and political reform cannot be offered the peoples of those countries, Communism will triumph without any positive intervention by Stalin. The Allies, since their invasion of Italy, through their inept handling of the situation and their utter failure to offer the Italian people any hopeful program of promise for the future, have made more Communists in Italy than the Comintern ever made. If we continue to forget that winning the war means more than crushing Nazi armies and refuse to assist the people of France to get on their feet as quickly as possible, we shall have proved effective communist propagandists in France.

All of Europe will move towards the Left after this war. If it moves all the way to Communism, it will not be because of Russian intervention, but because of the obstructionist tactics of die-hard reactionaries who, despite all the lessons of recent years, still think that they can restore the (for them) comfortable world of economic and political liberalism. That world is happily dead. Any effort to restore it will unhappily assure the triumph of Communism.

The answer to Communism lies in a dynamic program of social revolution; and Christian social philosophy, as Archbishop McNicholas has pointed out, can supply such a program. Unfortunately too, many Christians regard the principles of "true Christian social justice" as "radical, dangerous and revolutionary" and are as afraid of them as they are of Communism. In fact they often identify them with Communism.

One last question needs to be examined. It is frequently objected that, granting that Stalin has subordinated world revolution to the immediate task of building Socialism in Russia, it is still true that world revolution remains the ultimate goal even in Stalin's thinking. Several things need to be said about this objection.

1) It is already a considerable gain over Trotsky, from the point of view of the rest of the world, that world revolution is not the immediate objective. As Dr. Waldemar Gurian recently remarked, if Stalin, like Trotsky, were an idealist there would be no hope. But it will take some generations before the primary goal of Socialism in Russia can be fully realized. Much can happen in the meantime. Those who from a few syllogisms out of their ethics manuals have concluded so confidently that Socialism cannot work have little to fear. Yet they are usually the same ones who express the greatest fear. If Socialism cannot work then it will never be realized in Russia. If it cannot realize even its im-

mediate objective why worry about its achieving its ultimate objective?

More pertinent: it must be borne in mind that revolutions have a history and are made by men. Before the primary task is fully achieved in Russia, those who lived through the heroic days of the revolution and therefore were under the full spell of its *doctrinaire* ideology will have passed from the scene. New generations of leaders will have supplanted them. They will be under different influences. They will not have shared the experience of professional revolutionaries conspiring to destroy the old regime. Their entire careers will have been devoted to the building of a new regime. It is altogether probable that the loyalties which their absorption in this task will create will be directed towards less theoretical objectives than revolution in distant countries and more and more towards the objects and tasks and people of the USSR. It seems beyond doubt that the present-day leaders of Soviet Russia feel far less community with and manifest far less concern for the proletariat of Germany, France, Italy, the United States, etc., than their revolutionary forefathers did. It is highly probable that their later descendants in Russia will feel even less vitally the mystic bond that unites the workers of the world. It is even within the realm of possibility that by that time the leaders of the Soviet system may be having difficulty sustaining a consciousness of mystic unity with the workers of Russia itself.

2) It proves little to marshal phrases from speeches of Stalin to prove that he is still a world revolutionist. The regime in Russia came into power under certain consecrated slogans. Many of those slogans have already come to mean little or nothing in practice. But it is naive to expect the Soviet leaders repudiate the venerated slogans. That could be interpreted as a repudiation of the revolution itself, and the Trotskyites would make great capital out of that. It is characteristic of revolutionary slogans that the heirs to the revolutionary regime must continue to pay them lip service long after they have ceased to be operative. There was precious little *fraternité*, and surely no *égalité* between the proletarianized workers in the *Banlieue Rouge* in Paris and the wealthy bourgeoisie in the Third Republic. But the consecrated slogan could always bring moisture to the eyes of the well-fed bourgeois as he raised his glass to the principles of the revolution.

The Russians too are people. How seriously Stalin holds to the ideological content of certain slogans it is impossible to say, and consequently interpretation of his policies and speculation as to their possible future evolution must be based not upon slogans but upon a careful study and analysis of forces and events.

Conclusion

The conclusions I draw from this analysis are these:

1) While the future holds many dangers, the possibility of establishing peace upon a basis of world co-operation exists. The first obligation that rests upon us is, therefore, to exploit that possibility to the full.

2) Those who have nothing to offer but diatribes against Stalin bring no relief to the Poles, no hope to the Baltic people, and contribute nothing to the cause of world peace or to the advancement of justice.

3) The world which will emerge from this war and from the peace settlement will in many respects fall short of the ideal of perfect justice: not only because of Poland and the Baltic States, but because of Hongkong, and Burma, and Indo-China, and India; and because of the American Negro; and because of the Southern sharecropper, the Oakies, the tens of thousands of Americans with insufficient health care, insufficient food, insufficient housing, insufficient education; and because of the tens of thousands of political prisoners languishing in Franco's jails; and because of a great many other things.

4) The prophets of doom can keep beating their drums; they can keep viewing with alarm the rise of Soviet power, pointing with fear to the Leftist movement in France, in Italy, to the Communist influence in labor unions, in the PAC, etc., until the Communist revolution sweeps over them. Or they can abandon their drums and come out into the arena of the world and unite their efforts with men of good-will everywhere to build a better world. If that better world is to be built it will be built not by dividing the world into two warring camps: the Communists and the anti-Communist. That has been tried and the common people of the world have had enough of it. It gave them Fascism and Naziism and it is threatening to give them more of the same in China. And the end result of that tactic can only mean eventual Communism. That better world can only be built by establishing an international society of nations, however imperfect, and making every effort to develop effective international cooperation in the field of politics and economics and, on the domestic front, by developing an imaginative, courageous, and frankly revolutionary program of social reformation which will be no less opposed to the tenets of liberal Capitalism than it is to those of Communism.

Argentina and the Church

(Continued from page seventy-eight)

trated (a recurring phenomenon in Latin American politics). Castillo, therefore, during the course of 1941 began to rule more and more by decree, dissolving the legislature and assuming dictatorial powers.

Second Revolution: 1943

The regime had been and continued to be exceedingly corrupt. Dissatisfaction grew. The conservatives feared the possibilities of a less conservative successor to Castillo or a split in the conservative ranks in the next presidential elections. In any case, what General Uriburu did in 1930, Generals Rawson and Ramírez and Colonel Perón did on June 4, 1943: they overturned the regime and instituted a military dictatorship, and they did it in exactly the same way. A few thousand troops marched into Buenos Aires in the small hours of the morning, took over the *Casa Rosada*, the post office and other public buildings, and proclaimed the dictatorship. The only bloodshed occurred when the Naval Academy resisted, probably through mistaken orders.

General Rawson was in only for a day. The military clique, disapproving certain actions, put in General Ramírez who held the presidential office until his resignation

on March 9, 1944. Again, the regime began immediately to set aright what it called a corrupt democracy. Indeed, as early as August 28 of that year, when the government was not yet three months old, President Ramírez announced that he had signed three thousand decrees. Now the Church (members of the hierarchy, Catholic Action, and the religious orders) was close to this regime from the start and the Government's attitude towards religion and morality was such as to win the approval of churchmen. It cleaned up much of the corruption of the former administration; it reorganized the whole national system of education in a manner favorable to religion and morality, and above all, it made the teaching of religion obligatory in the public schools as part of the regular curriculum. The weekly Catholic publication of highest prestige in intellectual circles, *El Criterio*, edited by Monseñor Franceschi, upheld government policies and it was known that the army chaplain, Father Wilkinson, was a very close friend of the President. The Catholic tone of many of the Government's pronouncements was attributed to him.

A sort of climax came in October, a gradual result of an exchange of notes which took place between Mr. Cordell Hull and the Argentine Foreign Minister, Admiral Storni. Cordell Hull's note had been clear and outspoken concerning the uncooperative spirit of the Ramírez regime, and consequently its content embarrassed the administration greatly. These notes were published in the Argentine press on September 8. The country became divided over the question of whether to break off relations with the Axis powers or not; it was said that the cabinet was also divided in its deliberations. In the course of October three cabinet members resigned and they were replaced by more conservative ministers, among them Gustavo Martínez Zuviría, known all over Latin America for his novels under the penname of Hugo Wast. Zuviría was made minister of Justice and Education. He was known as a very ardent Catholic, a very great conservative, and somewhat of a Jew baiter, since several of his novels were considered an attack against them. However, it was later reported that Cardinal Copello had ordered Father Wilkinson to sever such close relationship with the government.

It was during this same October that one hundred and eighty-three citizens, many of them prominent in their professions, signed a respectfully worded petition to the Government advocating a break with the Axis powers and a return to democratic forms of government. All of these signatories who held government positions, some of them internationally known as scientists, besides being university professors, or on the state hospital staffs, were forthwith dismissed. It was now that the well-organized Catholic Action, the *Acción Católica Argentina*, under the high direction of the hierarchy, forbade under pain of dismissal any of its members to criticize the Government in any way. In the meantime, it was evident that the liberal-minded Bishop, Monseñor de Andrea, was not in agreement with all that was going on, and when he was about to give a public address entitled "Liberty and Authority" the affair was postponed and then called off by order of the Government. And all through the latter part of 1943, the Ramírez regime was

becoming more and more dictatorial in its methods. For instance, on November 10, a new decree announced the creation of a new sub-secretariat of state, one of whose departments had power over press and propaganda.

In Buenos Aires during these months many Catholics were beginning to fear for the reputation of the Catholic Church, and to consider the leading churchmen imprudent in identifying themselves so closely with policies of Government. Letters were written to the hierarchy by alarmed Catholics; some were directed to the president of the Jesuit *Colegio del Salvador*. Ambassador Norman Armour, friend of many of these churchmen and sympathetic towards the Catholic Church, shook his head, apparently dissatisfied with the way things were going.

This dictatorship in Argentina is illustrative of what has happened over and over again in the history of Latin America. The known and sometimes extreme corruptions of a democratic regime give occasion to the moralist, to the conservative, and to many an honest citizen to decry such a regime and to find the only national hope (at least for the time being) in a strong house-cleaning dictatorship. The corruptions of the democratic regimes preceding the military dictatorship were great. A Deputy of the Chamber, who represented a group of interests in the north and who controlled a number of votes necessary to pass an economic measure considered vital to national interests, refused to vote in favor of it, unless an impending sales tax bill was altered to exempt from taxation his particular interests. It was discovered that two women who had been on the government payroll as school teachers had never taught school in their lives and were engaged in other salaried occupation. Nepotism had become rampant and the state offices were filled with the friends and relatives of government officials, who drew a salary but did no work. The mails were not sacred. There was lots of petty thievery and non-arrival of letters at their destination, for they had been destroyed by government postal employees in order to acquire the unspoiled postage stamp upon them.

It is such things as this, such inefficiency and corruption as democratic regimes in Latin America have often turned into, which give occasion to the conservative, to churchmen, for instance, to become skeptical about the blessings of democracy and to support a regime which, though dictatorial, is at least efficient, and more honest than its predecessor. If such a regime is at the same time favorable to religion and friendly to the Church, the majority of churchmen, as Latin American history has shown, will support it. In Argentina in 1930 and again in 1943 a military dictatorship replaced a reputed democracy and both times the revolution enjoyed the support of the Church.

Editorials

(Continued from page eighty)

In speaking of the Yalta Conference and its effect on Poland he says, "the supremely important aspect of the whole problem is the future independence of the Polish State. You are not wise if you act as though the worst is inevitable. Is the position as hopeless as you, my Polish friends, are quite naturally inclined to assume?"

Against such a view we find a strange combination of adversaries. On the one hand are the hyper-realists, who are convinced that no nation or national leader can be trusted, that no organization can work, and who argue against present efforts on the strength of these premises. Their comrades-in-arms are the idealists who feel that any surrender, especially in that broad and undefined field of national sovereignty, must spell injustice and defeat. One proposes to them the seeming promise of the Act of Chapultepec. Their reply is to denounce the secret methods and the compromises of Yalta. If one asks what avenue lies open to our strivings for a secure peace they offer no other practical way.

As this issue of *The Historical Bulletin* appears, many nations of the world are to meet at San Francisco. Men assemble to devise a protection against future holocausts. Each of us, as individuals, will journey to the Golden Gate in spirit. To the one who feels that he may ignore or scorn this effort must be given the answer which is given by Cardinal Suhard, Archbishop of Paris, to those who would take a like pose toward the "inevitable" social transformation in France. "It is the duty of the members of society and more particularly of its leaders to devote themselves to this task. Nothing authorizes them to take refuge in abstention, on the pretext, for example, that the undertaking will arouse suspicion, that it is dangerous or that it will end in failure . . . Shall it be achieved without us? In that case there can be no illusion. It will be accomplished in opposition to us."

Looking to the years that lie ahead we are all filled with concern. In the past power has failed to maintain a world peace. The alternative is a system of international organization operating on a moral and juridical basis. The joint *Declaration on World Peace*, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and the renewed pledge of leaders that their aim is a system to prevent future war, Mexico City and the Act of Chapultepec, and now the San Francisco conference, are steps along the way. But our role is to be more than that of the observant chronicler recording events for future generations to read. Our democracy demands the education and active participation of the people.

For Catholics it is more than a patriotic duty that we should seek to forward, with criticism and support, such plans. Steadily the realization has grown that hope is to rest in the people, and by this very fact they must assume a new responsibility. A break must be made from the dangerous mental states of defeatism or purposeful aloofness. Each must be prepared to make a personal offering for common good, and none may sabotage the common effort by withdrawing into a shell of outraged perfectionism. Such a negative attitude puts in jeopardy the present holding and all hope of future gain. Rather, with a realism born of the century-old wisdom and experience of the Church, and an idealism based on faith in Providence and the "moral maturity of the individual citizen," each of us must work for that which "the absolute order of beings and purposes . . . comprises as a moral necessity and the crowning of social development, the unity of mankind and of the family of peoples."

DONALD R. CAMPION

The Weimar Constitution

(Continued from page eighty-two)

The question naturally arises, of the relation of the Reichstag and the "Emergency Powers" granted to the President in the famous article 48. In considering the development of this phase of the constitution, one cannot help regretting that, as time went on, the Reichstag failed to realize the great authority that was put in its hands for the purpose of controlling the misuse of these powers on the part of the President of the Reich. The constitution clearly gives the Reichstag the right of control by demanding in article 48 that the President immediately communicate to the Reichstag all measures taken by virtue of the powers given him and declared in paragraph one and two of this article. Furthermore, it is stipulated that the President must abrogate whatever measures he has taken, on demand of the Reichstag.¹⁸ A further safeguard is provided in Article 25 which limits the power of the President of the Reichstag in dissolving the body: he can dissolve the Reichstag only once for the same cause.¹⁹ There is even a further check for the control of the President by the Reichstag, a control which is provided in Article 43. This article states that by a two-thirds majority vote the President can be suspended from further exercise of his functions until a popular vote either supports the Reichstag in a move towards removing the President from office, or repudiates the policy of the Reichstag by keeping the President in office. If the popular vote should keep the President in office, the dissolution of the Reichstag shall follow.²⁰

From reading the Weimar Constitution it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Ogg is right when he says that the Reichstag "at all events was expected to become a flywheel, to which the entire mechanism of government was geared, and by which it was to be kept in balance." There are many reasons for the failure of the representatives of the German people to realize their key position; that they did so fail, there can be no doubt. A consideration of the events which led to the ascendancy of Hitler reveals all too clearly that the German people did not realize the ideal set before them by the framers of the Weimar Constitution: for the relation of those events reveals the actions of the President, of the Chancellor, of "emergency decrees," and, sadly of a Reichstag all too easily dissolved. Was it the fault of the Reichstag, or the fault of the German people themselves?

The President

In coming to the discussion of the office of the President of the Reich we meet a difficulty, namely, the fact that the authors of the Weimar Constitution wanted a strong but not too strong representative body. How then were they to put a check on the powers of the Reichstag? In their solution, it seems that they manifested the spirit summed up in the words of Professor Kraus which we have already quoted, namely, that these men were frightened by their own courage. Fortunately, we have Hugo Preuss' own ideas on this

question. Brunet observes that the problem before Preuss was to institute a chief of state sufficiently powerful to act as a balance to the Reichstag and to control the latter in the name of the people, still not give him such power as would enable him to dominate or annihilate the rights of the Reichstag.²¹ This problem is summed up in Preuss' own words:

Granting that the institutions set up by our constitution should be as profoundly as possible stamped with democratic character, it is best, for the solidity of the whole edifice, that there should be in some part of it a durable and firm framework.²²

Finer points out in this connection that Preuss and his followers realized the need of a counterpoise to the Reichstag. Parliamentary government was certainly the desideratum; but to secure both democracy and efficiency it was necessary to secure, first, parliamentary government, and only secondly those additions which would prevent it from creating its own stultification.²³ In a speech delivered before the Constitutional Committee, Preuss said:

It has been said that it is not necessary to have a counterpoise to the Reichstag, because the Referendum, and ultimately, the activity of the Councils, will produce sufficient counterpoise. That may be so. But to act as counterpoise against the Reichstag is only one of the functions of the President. There is also a more important one: to constitute a definite center, an immovable pole in the Constitution. The more councils you have which are to co-operate, the more mass voting through the Referendum, the Reichstag, the Works of Councils, and so on, the greater the need for a strong point in which, at least in the idea, the threads will run together.²⁴

However, it should be noted that the authors of the Weimar Constitution did not clearly conceive just how much power they wanted to give the President, once they created that office. They looked about for a precedent, but they followed none of the existing patterns in their own creation; they seem to have tried to combine the best qualities of the British, French and American systems. The uncertainty of these men is reflected in the document which they finally accepted. Thus Professor Kraus says in this connection:

One would seek in vain to ascertain from the contents of the constitution what degree of political influence the . . . President . . . (is) expected to exert in the structure of the governmental machine. The constitution has left this to future development.²⁵

Although the members who approved the Weimar Constitution agreed to create a "definite center, an immovable pole," they did not wish to destroy the "fly wheel, to which the entire mechanism of government was (to be) geared." Consequently they provided checks on the actions of the President. Article 50 is very important in view of the remarks just made: so important, in fact, that Finer makes the rather astounding statement that "Article 50 makes the fundamental irresponsibility and powerlessness of the President plain."²⁶ The article under discussion provides that

All orders and decrees of the President of the Reich, including those concerning the armed force, require for their validity the counter-signature of the Chancellor or of the competent national minister. Responsibility is accepted by the act or counter-signature.²⁷

¹⁸ McBain, H. L., *op cit.*, pp. 185 ff. ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 185. ²¹ Quoted from Brunet, R., *op cit.*, p. 156.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 161. ²³ Finer, H., *op cit.*, p. 1145.

²⁴ Finer, H., *op cit.*, p. 1146. ²⁵ Kraus, H., *op cit.*, p. 166.

²⁶ Finer, H., *op cit.*, p. 1153. ²⁷ McBain, H. L., *op cit.*, p. 186.

This article, Finer goes on to say, is undoubtedly the ruling article of the section relating to the Reich President and the Government. Indeed, without Article 50 the President would be a dictator for seven years with a tremendous range of power; with it, the law permits him only the power of personal influence. In some ways one suspects that in this discussion a new key is found to explain the difficulties which overtook the government under the Weimar Constitution. Finer goes on to point out that the President has a good threat to a Reichstag which will not withdraw confidence from a Ministry which unrightfully stultifies his attempts at personal influence. But it is a threat which destroys itself the moment it is used, and any attempt to move by its agency inevitably brings trouble upon the President.²⁸ Perhaps the tragedy of the Weimar Republic is due to the fact that the personal influence of the President overcame a Reichstag no longer jealous of its prerogatives.

In considering the office of President under the Weimar Constitution, it is necessary to point out that with all his power and personal influence, the President can be removed from office. We have already seen how his dismissal can be brought about by use of the power given to the Reichstag in article 43. Moreover, the Reichstag has the power, granted it by article 59, to bring before the Supreme Judicial Court impeachment proceedings against the President of the Reich for a wrongful violation of the constitution or of a national law.²⁹

Before leaving the discussion of the President of the Reich, a few remarks concerning the famous article 48 and its use are in place. We have already seen that, although this article gives the President wide powers, the Reichstag is also given by the same article an effective check on his use of these powers. History tells us of the sad failure of the Reichstag to appreciate its position and its power. In 1930, when the conditions of the times were becoming desperate, the President of the Reich invoked his powers according to Article 48. The Reichstag, by a majority vote, demanded that two of the pivotal emergency decrees be revoked. The President gave in, but at the same time dissolved the Reichstag, a move which was entirely within his power. Then, the President reenacted the same two decrees as a new measure. When the newly elected Reichstag convened, it let the measure stand, rather than use its constitutional power of checking the President.³⁰

In considering different phases of the Weimar Constitution there is great danger of becoming confused. This confusion can be due partially to the fact that there may be a tendency to forget that there is some difference between what was laid down in the Weimar Constitution and in later constitutional development. Ogg is well aware of this, for he writes:

Fitted, to be sure, into a cabinet system of government, and endowed with powers which in the main he was not intended to exercise as personal prerogatives, he was nevertheless designed to be, in the words of Dr. Preuss, 'a definite center, an immovable pole,' in the constitution; and the position which he oc-

cupied would be hard to characterize, not only because the times in which the Weimar system operated were abnormal and the only popularly elected president not a typical political figure, but because the office, created by grafting a strong executive on to a parliamentary system, was a unique device which, even by 1933, had not as yet revealed its full possibilities.³¹

The Cabinet

We have seen that the authors of the Weimar Constitution gave ample powers to the Reichstag as well as to the President of the Reich. Along with the powers bestowed on the representative body and the executive, there were provided strong checks on the actions of each. Articles 52 to 58 lay down the general principles governing the construction of a cabinet which consists of a Chancellor and Ministers. It had the duty to direct the business of government and would stand between the President and the Reichstag. The Chancellor is to be appointed by the President; the Ministers by the same, but only on the recommendation of the Chancellor. The Cabinet is not to be directly under the President, for it needs the confidence of the Reichstag for the exercise of its office. The Chancellor is given an important position, though there is some discussion concerning the question whether or not he occupies a position which is more than that of *primus inter pares*. However, there is no doubt that, whatever his official position, it is his task as Chancellor "to lay down the general course of policy," and he is "responsible therefore to the Reichstag." This provision may well have prompted Munro to observe that "the German Chancellor, if the Weimar Constitution operates according to its general intent, may some day become the real chief executive."³² It is difficult to understand this observation in the light of the provisions of Article 56, according to which each national minister is given the authority to conduct the branch of administration intrusted to him. Moreover, according to the same article, each minister is to conduct his business independently, excepting two restrictions. First, each minister is required to follow the general policy laid down by the Chancellor; secondly, each minister bears personal responsibility to the Reichstag for his actions, and must retire if he fails to retain the confidence of that body.³³ Munro's statement is more understandable if the emphasis is put on the words, "if the Weimar Constitution operates according to its general intent," because then it can be interpreted in the light of the purpose of the authors of this constitution, that there should be a majority in control of the Reichstag whose duty it would be to run the government backed by the confidence of the representative body.

Though it is outside our purpose to discuss the actual operation of the Weimar Constitution, it will not be entirely out of place to recall the fate of the Cabinet in the course of the years following the acceptance of that constitution. It was the purpose of Preuss and his followers to have the Chancellor determine the policy of the government (Article 56), but due to a very practical difficulty arising out of the system of proportional representation, the Chancellor never had sufficient

²⁸ Finer, H., *op. cit.* pp. 1153 f

²⁹ McBain, H. L., *op. cit.*, p. 187.

³⁰ Marx, F. M., *op. cit.*, p. 61. ³¹ Ogg, F. A., *op. cit.*, p. 679.

³² Munro, W. B., *The Governments of Europe*, p. 626.

³³ McBain, H. L., *op. cit.*, p. 187.

strength to control a majority in the Reichstag. Of necessity, all the Cabinets in Germany under the Weimar Constitution were coalition Cabinets. Finer remarks:

... the Chancellor's main lines of policy are established as much by his colleagues as by him—how much of the one, or of the other, depends upon the comparative strength in the Reichstag and the desire for office, and the power to injure if one remains in opposition. Thus the Chancellor is partly the creature of the Ministers, and is always dependent on them. Finally, though he nominates them, they possess the power to compel the nomination, and even decide the offices they shall hold. Anschütz claims that this is in direct contradiction to the Constitution. He is right; the Cabinet system in Germany follows the party-system, not the Constitution.³⁴

The concluding sentence of the above quotation is very significant; it points out the great weakness of the government of Germany under the Weimar Constitution. Due largely to the system of proportional representation, no government had a fair chance to work out the principles of the constitution according to the plans of its author. Parties are inevitable under a democratic form of government. Hence members of a representative body, even though "subject only to their consciences and not bound by instructions,"³⁵ are not

³⁴ Finer, H., *op. cit.*, p. 1100.

³⁵ McBain, H. L., *op. cit.*, p. 181.

likely to forget those to whom they owe their positions as representatives of the people. The party system triumphed; and since there never was a time when one party commanded a clear majority in the Reichstag, it was practically impossible to form a stable government which could work according to the plan of Hugo Preuss. The Reichstag failed to realize the goal set for it in the Weimar Constitution; its failure meant the defeat of democracy in Germany.

Conclusion

Many more features of the Weimar Constitution could be discussed, such as the machinery for elections; ways of amending the constitution; the position of the Reichstag; the fundamental rights and duties of Germans; but these must be left to a possible future study. It is clear that the Weimar Constitution in operation was different from the constitution as it was adopted in 1919. There was much room for adjustment, and this necessarily so; but it can be said that the adjustment was along lines foreign to the spirit of the framers of this historic document. The Weimar Constitution failed. But would it not be better to say that the German people failed to realize the hopes of better days because they were not yet fully disposed to make the most of the benefits of Democracy?

Recent Books in Review

Paideia, the Ideals of Greek Culture, by Werner Jaeger. New York. Oxford University Press. 1944. Vol III, pp. viii + 374. \$3.75

The third volume of *Paideia* brings to a close Professor Jaeger's study of the ideals of Greek culture. In it he discusses three factors which influenced the ideals handed down from the classic poets and the pre-Socratic philosophers: medicine, philosophy (in the Platonic sense), and rhetoric. Medicine which, as is proper, occupies only a very small portion of the book, was concerned with the physical foundation upon which the Greek built both his corporal and spiritual culture. The empiric and philosophical relations in Greek therapeutics, diet, and exercise are treated adequately, and the picture drawn is authenticated by quotations and citations from both primary and the better secondary sources.

The rest of the book is taken up with the discussion of the conflict between the rhetorical ideal of Isocrates and the philosophic ideal of Plato.

Isocrates was a rather shallow thinker but believed that rhetorical excellence could not be attained without a certain relation and correspondence to excellence of thought. Still he was eminently practical, emphasizing style and figure rather than depth of content. Isocrates held that Greek culture, though it had sprung almost exclusively from Athens, was to be the unifying force which should effect a sort of internationale among the Greek states. Hence he would use education to indoctrinate his pupils with the idea of a Panhellenism. The use Isocrates made of history is brought out in Jaeger's discussion of the *Letter to Nicocles*. "Experience he defines as knowledge of the past, which constantly shows its value as a source of historical examples. Nicocles (he continues) must learn from it what happens to individuals and to rulers—that is, he must find out the universal and permanent conditions which govern their lives and conduct. If he studies the past and remembers it, he will be better able to judge of the future," (p. 100-101). The author's treatment of the use of history in Greek education follows in a short excursus.

Contrasted with the practical politician stands Plato (whose *paideia* is treated at length in volume two). Jaeger's discussion of the *Phaedrus* (rhetoric) and *Laws* is enlightening in every

respect. Taking the more modern conjecture as to the late date of *Phaedrus*, he sees in it Plato's evaluation of the then current emphasis upon rhetoric, and his defense of the mathematics and dialectic taught at the Academy. This section is probably the most valuable chapter of the whole book.

Plato's experiment in putting into practise the ideas expressed in the *Republic* is described in a short chapter, just long enough to sketch the story and pass gracefully to his treatment on the *Laws*. On page 194 the author has the remark, "In the strictly theocentric character of the *paideia* taught by Plato in his later period, all the unanswered problems (the *aporiai*) of his earlier books are solved at last." Though one should expect this statement to be proved in the chapters on *Laws*, there is offered no real explanation of the process of thought by which Plato should have brought about this happy freedom from *aporia*. It must be granted nevertheless that the chapters on the *Laws* are quite complete in other respects, constitute in fact one of the best and most unbiased handlings the *Laws* has ever had. Most commentators and historians of Plato take the *Laws* in the manner that best suits the thesis they have defended in other parts of their work on Plato; but the author of *Paideia* has a very objective account despite the originality of his thesis.

The chapters devoted to Xenophon and Demosthenes exhibit a thoroughly sympathetic understanding of these two difficult men. Demosthenes especially is presented in a light that should make the readers of other less favorable (and less accurate) studies go back to the sources and study Mr. Jaeger's interpretation of them.

Though the author did not use up valuable paper in drawing modern parallels, he has expressed himself in modern language. The reader can easily see the relation of education and culture to political history—a point that is being emphasized in the modern approach to history. If a nation in a crisis has to re-educate and retrain its youth to make them fit to serve their country, the education and training they were receiving should be examined. *Paideia* will help in this examination.

The notes in volume three, much more numerous than those in the first volume, are accurate and useful; the references to Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, and Demosthenes were checked by the reviewer, and from the results he can see no reason to doubt

the correctness of the citations from the medical writers except that he did not have the opportunity to check them.

A thorough study in every sense, the third volume of *Paideia* is a worthy sequel to the first two, deserving a place in the library of every student of history. Dr. Jaeger has done a very creditable job in these three volumes, and if he can continue the same scholarly and unbiased work, the series should be extended through the later centuries of antiquity as the author suggests in the prefaces to the first and second volumes.

LE ROY ENDRES.

Mater Ecclesia, An Inquiry into the Concept of the Church as Mother in Early Christianity (Catholic University of America Studies in Christian Antiquity, Vol V), by Joseph C. Plumpe. Washington, Catholic University Press. 1943. pp. xxi + 149. \$2.00

In this thorough and competent study, Father Plumpe investigates the origins, history, and significance of the long-established custom of referring to the Church of Christ as 'Mother.' By an elaborate yet vital and balanced analysis of all extant literary and archaeological evidence on the point from the beginnings through the third century, the author has put at the disposal of historians an important and interesting story in the field of the nascent Church's developing consciousness of her religious and social role in human affairs. The whole is thoroughly documented, and texts of key importance are given in full, with parallel translation. There are four plates showing early representations of the Church as Mother, a complete index, and special indices covering all citations from sources ancient and modern. The book is a valuable repository of many notable quotations, and puts the entire picture clearly against its historical and theological background.

The concept of *Mater Ecclesia* is shown to have first sprung up in Phrygia, under a combined influence of local Great Mother cults in the old pagan religions and the purifying, sublimating imagery of the Church as parent, in Christ, of all spiritual life, an imagery found in St. Paul, St. John, and early Christian mysticism. From its origin in Phrygia, not later than 150, the idea spread rapidly to Egypt and North Africa, Syria and Palestine. In the West, great teachers of Eastern education, like St. Irenaeus, St. Methodius, the writer of the Epistle of the Martyrs of Lyons and Vienne, promoted the concept, but it did not find favor or general acceptance at Rome or in Europe until after the fourth century. An explanation of this is the author's indication that the image simply did not appeal to the Roman mind, sentiments, and imagination at the beginning; that it is primarily an Oriental metaphor.

In its early stages, the Motherhood of the Church was mostly looked at from the aspect of her begetting sons of God in grace and nourishing them supernaturally; not from the modern viewpoint of her tender maternal solicitude and wise guidance.

Some of this book is rather heavy reading, because so closely argued and so full of documentation. And the sketch of the Scriptural background of the concept is too jejune to indicate its deep psychological influence. These are but small defects in a valuable study, which does its author much credit.

RAYMOND V. SCHODER.

AMERICAN HISTORY

Diary and Letters of Josiah Gregg, Excursions in Mexico and California 1847-1850. Edited by Maurice Garland Fulton, with introduction by Paul Horgan. Norman, Oklahoma. University of Oklahoma Press. 1944. pp. xvii + 396. \$3.50

Despite the great number of facts and figures which take up much of the space in these letters and jottings, there are very many interesting character sketches, and most interesting of all a clear delineation of the man himself, Josiah Gregg. For those who have read the first part of this set, *Southwestern Enterprises, 1840-1847*, this edition of later letters and notes will be a welcome volume. It is another step toward the complete picture of the Spanish Southwest, and a valuable addition to western biography and history.

As the introduction brings out, and as is verified in the interesting pages that follow, Gregg was a combination trader, artist, scientist and adventurer. He was an "intellectual frontiersman of the natural world . . . his weapons were curiosity and

a batch of little bound books with blank pages, waiting to be written upon."

This volume begins with the notes and letters from the pen of Josiah Gregg at the Battle of Buena Vista in the Spring of 1847. During the following months he traveled with Doniphan's Missourians, not practicing his medicine, but rather taking exact scientific notes all along the trip, from Chihuahua to Saltillo. In May he returned to the United States by way of the southern route and New Orleans, going to Philadelphia and New York, arriving in Washington in August. He returned to Saltillo, not as a merchant as he had planned when he left his things there, but as a doctor. After a month's stay in Shreveport, he reached his new Mexican home in the late fall.

The vivid stories the diary contains tell of the soldiers, American soldiers, at Saltillo, and the partner he took into practice with him. In December of the following year, 1848, the scientist took up traveling again, going south to Mexico City. At Llanito he happened upon a religious festival and immediately wrote down his judgment of the great riches of the friars and the Church. At the Shrine of Guadalupe, the scientist joked at the tale of the miraculous roses, saying: "I have handled fresh roses to-day (January 7)." Not much pleased with the sight of the capital city and surroundings, he spent most of his time visiting the surrounding area for botanical specimens.

Before he left Mexico City in April, he viewed the Holy Thursday and Good Friday ceremonies. His remark was that they "were a waste of time, labor and wealth." He referred to the priests as "sanctified beggars." He complained of the "rattle-trap noises."

As the diary of his trip to California unfolds, Josiah Gregg shows himself more and more disgruntled and perturbed at the least thing. His health gives way in the heat of Mazatlan, which he reached on June 7, 1849. He had planned a fruitful scientific trip up the coast line, but gave up the idea to take a boat to San Francisco. In the epilogue, the editor supplies the reader with details furnished by others concerning the final trip and death of Josiah Gregg, near Clear Lake, sometime in February 1850.

What one likes about published diaries and notes is all in this volume, with each detail given as written. If the reader prefers to have his material digested for him, and the excess date lines and barometer readings removed, then the editor has not completed the task for him. As a picture of private relations between America and Mexico and a collection of character and scientific sketches, this volume of letters and notes gives most interesting reading material for the historian.

R. NEENAN.

Amerigo Vespucci, Pilot Major, by Frederick J. Pohl. New York. Columbia University Press. 1944. pp. x + 249. \$3.00

Amerigo Vespucci is a book that has all the desirable features of a work of love, for that is just what it is. Mr. Pohl's occupation and the career for which he has trained himself is in the field of English; he teaches it, having received his Master's degree in English at Columbia University. History, therefore, is a hobby with the author. As he himself tells, "Getting acquainted with Amerigo Vespucci must have begun like any real friendship, for I cannot remember when or how." It was a clerk in a Copenhagen antique shop who really started him on the present work in 1937. He wanted to see some antique Chinese porcelain and was shown some old maps of America instead. They were so interesting that Mr. Pohl suddenly had a new hobby, and a very productive one.

The problem attacked in *Amerigo Vespucci* is not a new one. Elementary school classrooms for many years have rung with the debate on why America was not called "Columbia." Martin Waldseemüller named the continent, America, on his map in 1507. Notwithstanding his own effort to withdraw the name from the map later, it has remained. For Mr. Pohl this fact is more than a happy coincidence; it is simple justice. The author holds that while Columbus found America in the sense in which one finds a sleeping cat, in the dark, with one's foot, Amerigo Vespucci actually discovered it, in the sense of recognizing the fact that he had come upon a new continent, not a neck of land or an extension of Asia, but a new, massive land, a whole new world.

The book is written with an enthusiastic partisanship that gives it a vigor and sparkle unusual in scholarly literature. The author's acknowledged bias does not, however, impair the critical singleness of his eye nor his sense of historical justice. His conclusions are reasoned and his documentation adequate and well chosen. Mr. Pohl's style lends itself well to pleasant reading,

even the analysis of evidence and the argument of his case for Vespucci is colorful and entertaining.

Mechanically, the book excels. Maps, most of them the author's sketches of famous maps, are very clear and their inscriptions legible. Some reprints, such as that of Juan de la Cosa's map, are too small to be of much use. Appendices give a handy chronology of Amerigo Vespucci's voyages of exploration and an important and very useful table called "Linear measurements of significance in the History of Exploration." This accessory is an immense timesaver for anyone who makes a study of maps. Notes are arranged in the back of the book, thus sparing the reader the distraction they cause when placed on each page. The bibliography is quite complete.

Amerigo Vespucci is a good biography and a finished piece of historical writing, a real tribute to the man it so ably champions.

JAMES B. CORRIGAN.

The Diplomatic Mission of John Lothrop Motley to Austria, 1861-1867, by Sister M. Claire Lynch, O.S.B. Washington, D. C. Catholic University Press. 1944. pp. viii + 159.

To understand more fully the competence of John Lothrop Motley, Minister to Austria from 1861 to 1867, the author rightly presents a brief but revealing sketch of his life. Like most American youths of the day, he was sent to complete his higher studies at the German universities. From 1832 to 1834 Motley observed and studied important liberalist movements; he saw nationalism springing up. It was at the University of Berlin that he gained the esteem and friendship of the young patriot, Otto von Bismarck.

Back home again Motley associated with such literary figures as Holmes, Prescott, Emerson, Lowell, Sumner, Hawthorne, and Longfellow. However, by 1846 he was convinced that his talents were in the field of history. Ten years later, in 1856, he was able to publish his famous *History of the Rise of the Dutch Republic*.

Then came the Civil War. Motley, a loyal unionist, offered his services to the federal government. His social acquaintances in Europe, his knowledge of the peoples, his favor with European political leaders, made him a valuable asset. He was appointed, in 1861, Minister to Vienna, a post which he held until 1867.

Motley soon analyzed Austria's weakness and could report to Seward "the unhealthy aspect of the Empire." He clearly saw that with the advent of nationalism the Hapsburg empire—consisting of eighteen different nationalities—must crumble. He understood Europeans, and though somewhat prejudiced, he tried to be objective in his reports. His interpretations of Austrian internal and foreign affairs were a great aid to the Washington government.

Sister Claire Lynch has made a careful study of the life of this American figure, and sheds light, from a neglected viewpoint, on an important and difficult period in American history. Through the eyes of an observer abroad at a time of national crisis, we see America as she appeared to the governments of Europe. Beyond this, for the student of European history there is an account of the observations of an historian on the contemporaneous struggle of an absolute government against the rising spirit of nationalism in its provinces.

ORVILLE CATUSO.

Until They Eat Stones by Russell Brines. J. B. Lippincott Company. Philadelphia. 1944. 329 + Index. \$3.00

Until They Eat Stones forces itself upon the reader by its very title; the contents satisfy the initial curiosity.

The author unfolds a part of the dramatic but barbarously cruel story of "a war of extermination." He lived close to Pacific affairs for more than ten years as an Associated Press correspondent. Of Japanese life he also has experience; he was a foreign correspondent in Tokyo before the war began; he was a war correspondent with the Japanese army in Manchuria; after the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the United States he served in the same capacity with the American-Filipino forces in Manila; finally, he was subject to Japanese supervision as a civilian internee in Santo Tomas in Manila and as a "political prisoner" in Shanghai.

This book is not, however, an account of a subjective aspect of a brutal and treacherous war. Dividing the material into four parts, "The Philippines," "The Southern Empire," "The Continental Empire," "The Homeland," the author uses his own experiences, information received from the Japanese themselves, from American, British and Dutch officials, and from radio re-

ports to give an objective survey. The events manifest a transformation affecting the lives of four hundred million people, and extending to the lives of at least as many more.

The first ten chapters carry the events which followed the fall of Manila, January 2, 1942, narrating the anxiety, trials and hardships of internment in Santo Tomas Camp.

The next three chapters describe Japanese activity in and around the Dutch East Indies, the "imperial treasure house": the exploitation of the rubber industry, oil deposits, and rice production.

Passing on to the mainland, the following three chapters are of interest because they form a background to the problems of the war in China. The chapters, *Tale of Three Cities*—Hongkong, Shanghai, and Peking—and *Exploitation Laboratory*—Manchuria in the years of conflict prior to Pearl Harbor—bring out many Japanese militaristic tactics, especially the gendarmerie, a counterpart of the Nazi Gestapo, and Japanism.

The first three chapters tell of conditions and events in the homeland; the stoical, if not maniacal sacrifice of the people to the cause of Japanese military doggedness and patience; above all, the fanaticism inherent in Shintoism, or emperor worship, as practised by the people at large.

On the whole the author manifests a clear insight into their mind and character. In the foreword he says: "The Japanese militarists are directing a diabolical war to advance detailed and timeless plans. They intend that their own people, whom they hold by physical and psychological chains, and the rest of their 400,000,000 subjects, dominated by force, shall fight until they eat stones."

In the Epilogue, the author gives expression to his views on the establishment of a lasting peace with Japan. It is prefaced by a very sane note of advice: "after this war we will face our greatest need for calm and clear thinking. The peace can be lost easily, especially in Asia. The future, in that case, would be appallingly vivid."

An index makes this a handy book for quick reference on a small part of the Pacific War.

WILLIAM H. STEINER.

CHURCH HISTORY

The Bond of Peace, by Michael Kent. Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Co. pp. 185. \$2.00

The approach to the problem of peace offered by Michael Kent in *The Bond of Peace* is new, if not in its essential points which are familiar enough to Catholics, at least as regards the long series of recent works on peace. The majority of these might be grouped into two general classes: statements of principles upon which the peace is to be built—and here one would put the utterances of the popes and their commentators—and statements of political, social, and economic solutions of practical problems. *The Bond of Peace* has a personal, spiritual message for Catholics; it seeks to bring the individual into the picture of universal peace.

It has long been the contention of Catholic historians that the modern decay of Europe's social and religious fabric must be traced to the collapse of spiritual unity at the time of the Reformation. The peoples of Europe, basically differentiated by race and by geographical factors, were held together by a bond of common belief under a common spiritual leader. In this state, war was necessarily limited to local strife by hired mercenaries. But the split in European unity, which came with the Protestant Revolt, radically altered the situation. Deprived of the binding unity of their faith, further deprived of consistent norms of morality, the peoples of Europe split up into relatively small racial groups; and soon threw up about themselves barriers of extreme nationalism. Such, indeed, was the way things happened, though a few restrictions must be made, which the author of this book fails to do, such as the growth in nationalism clearly traceable in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

To restore peace, the bond of peace, which is spiritual unity, must first be restored. Michael Kent first shows how peace in the past has failed to last, because it was built upon the shaky foundations of materialism and "liberal emancipation," both of which are logical offspring of the tenets of early Protestant leaders. He parallels the figures of Luther and Hitler, demonstrating by a multitude of quotations the similarities of their thought and expression. To overcome the defects in morality and philosophy which are the cause of present-day war, he pleads for the return of Christian unity. Realizing the magnitude of his task, he offers as his solution—and it is the personal one mentioned above—the spiritual solidarity of Catholics in an attempt to restore much needed unity. This can only be done by concerted prayer and sacrifice.

To understand and evaluate properly *The Bond of Peace* one must realize that it is a Catholic book written, exclusively I would say, for Catholics. As such it is a stimulating book with a genuine message. The theory of the breakdown of unity is not an original contribution, the work on this having been done long ago by Dawson, Belloc, and others. Mr. Kent's attack on the non-Catholics is much too polemic, and falls into bad taste in its treatment of Luther. Another rather noticeable defect is the obscurity of quotation sources. A variety of historians, Catholic and non-Catholic, is quoted without proper reference, with the result that often there is doubt about the author of the quotation. At least once in the book there is careless, rather dangerous use of language, i. e., the confusion of the terms *brute* and *animal*.

These blemishes notwithstanding, Catholics will find in this book a worthwhile contribution to Catholic thought on the problem of peace.

JOHN M. GINSTERBLUM.

Treatise on the Spiritual Life, by St. Vincent Ferrer, O. P., translated by Fr. T. A. Dixon, O. P. Westminster, Md. The Newman Book Shop. 1944. pp. 58. \$0.50

Though this treatise written by an expert in his field is an excellent piece of work, it cannot, I think, be recommended unqualifiedly to all. The author had in mind his own religious brethren of the Order of St. Dominic and so, quite naturally, much of what he has written would have no application to, and be of little interest to one who is not a religious. But the historian of the religious orders will find here as in the writings of a St. Francis of Sales a true mirror of the author's mind and way of life.

The book may be contrasted and compared with the works of St. Francis of Sales in many ways. Both were written at the request of religious and were meant for their direction; both follow a similar plan; both draw much of their content from the "writings and expressions of the holy doctors of the Church." St. Vincent's treatise is much shorter, (it would be considered a good-sized pamphlet today) contains facts and advice with little embellishment and assuredly no excess verbiage. Of the nineteen chapters of the book, only two extend for more than four pages. In the words of the translator's foreword: "It is short, but it abounds in matter. Each sentence is more valuable than gold." But this does not mean that the reader will not have to do a little digging in search of it.

It would not be fair to pass on without a mention of one of the most commendable features of the book, the very excellent and polished translation by Father Dixon. Unlike many works of this kind, the language is up to date as well as pleasurable to the eye.

ANDREW F. MAGINNIS.

Pope Pius XII, Priest and Statesman, by Kees Van Hoek. New York. Philosophical Library. 1944. pp. 106. \$2.00

The author begins by giving us an idea of the spirit which still animated the aged Pope Pius XI though he was at death's door. Here indeed was a great example for future popes, the example of a holy priest and a capable statesman. And there was one man who, by his natural talents and his close association with Pius XI was better suited than any other to carry on the traditions this pope had made. Eugenio Pacelli is the present Pope Pius XII. It is the purpose of the author to show that Pius XII is carrying on the tradition by being himself a holy priest and a great statesman. By showing us the character of the man who really wanted to be nothing more or less than a simple curate, he proves his point convincingly.

Pacelli wanted to be a parish priest; God wanted him to be something else. His superior talents were soon discovered; the Vatican Secretary of State had him placed in the diplomatic corps, where he soon rose to the under Secretaryship. He had a large share in the tremendous task of collecting and ordering the Law of the Church. After the war, as Papal Nuncio, he contacted governments the world over. And when he was made Secretary of State, the aged Pontiff, during the critical period from 1930 to 1939, leaned heavily on his wisdom and experience. In the face of this evidence the author is justified in claiming for Pius XII the title of statesman as well as priest.

Besides establishing these two titles the author gives interesting sidelights about the papal election and coronation, about the splendor and dignity of the court, about the interviews and daily routine of the pope, about his visit to America.

WILLIAM J. ZACHER.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Sociology of the Renaissance, by Alfred Von Martin, tr. by W. L. Luetkens. New York. Oxford University Press. 1944. pp. x + 100. \$2.50

The importance of this little book of less than one hundred pages of text is in inverse proportion to its size. Anyone who wants to understand how radically the rise of a money economy has changed the soul of the world needs to read this book. There are innumerable books which adequately describe the change that has been wrought upon the face of the world. Most discussions of the merits or demerits of capitalist economy tend to center upon the superficial transformations, the quantitative achievements, the grandiose accomplishments which capitalism has effected. There has been little perception of the profound transformations which the triumph of a money economy has worked in man's spiritual outlook. It is a measure of the thoroughness of the transformation that even Catholics, who should be the legatees of the spirit of the Middle Ages, do not even know what one is talking about when one attacks the compromising character of bourgeois Christianity. They do not know any other kind of Christianity. That is why they can never understand a Bloy, a Peguy, a Bernanos (whose *Plea For Liberty* sold only a few hundred copies in its English translation), but easily understand a Petain, a Renault, a Kelly, or even a Hague.

The author, who is an analyst not himself concerned with passing value judgments, lays bare the roots of our modern "Christian" civilization which has done a rather thorough job of destroying Christian culture. It has in fact done so thorough a job that that culture has become unintelligible to Christians. That is why the rare individual who really believes in the Christian values of devotion, sacrifice, honor, principle, charity, justice, loyalty, integrity, will be repudiated by none more quickly than by his fellow Christians.

This book will help one to understand how it has come to pass that "prudence," the characteristic bourgeois virtue, is oftener upon the lips of bourgeois "spiritual" mentors than charity upon the lips of St. John. He will understand how "moderation" has supplanted *largesse*, how cool calculation has taken the place of unreckoning devotion to an ideal (how badly Christ on the Cross calculated!), how an ecclesiastic can without remorse sacrifice Christian principle to win the good-will of smug little bourgeois whose contributions are so useful. He will learn a great deal about the origins of the spirit of pragmatism, utilitarianism, egoism, individualism and of all the stuffy bourgeois "ideas" which are a greater threat to genuine Christianity than Communism and Nazism combined. The Catholic reader will, perhaps, be saddened to discover that these origins ante-date the rise of Protestantism. With the rise of a money economy in pre-Reformation Renaissance Italy all the characteristics of bourgeois "Christianity" are clearly defined.

GEORGE H. DUNNE.

Creative Demobilization by E. A. Gutkind. The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction. II Vol. New York. Oxford University Press. 1944. pp. 328 + 280. \$12.00

Creative Demobilization is a careful study designed to make use of the occasion offered by the war to improve the structure of a community, both from the standpoint of efficiency as well as beauty. The first volume is devoted to "The Principles of National Planning," and the second volume to "Case Studies in National Planning." A large number of persons have contributed to the second volume under Gutkind's editorship, and have dealt with a wide variety of areas, industries, and processes. The fact that with very few exceptions, the practical discussions proceed in British terms aids to the concreteness of the treatment, but naturally creates an atmosphere of remoteness for the American reader.

The first volume contains some fertile ideas on the broader subject of planning. Karl Mannheim's acute observation is quoted with approval,—"The liberal age could give its whole attention to the propagation of the ideas of freedom, for it could build on the foundations of the traditional conformity it had inherited from the old community culture of the Middle Ages." The author has apparently kept his relative purposes very definitely in the right order; "every direct interference with personal

life must be excluded; personal life is not planned unless we wish to put the clock back to a totalitarian state." "The house or the flat must not be a burden for either husband or wife. It must not be something like a totalitarian state encroaching on the time and energy of its inhabitants. The house and the flat exists for their sake, not vice versa." "No surer way could be found of wrecking all hope of a systematic reconstruction than trying to plan the individual human being." This danger should not be underrated.

The scope of the problems dealt with is so broad that it would be hopeless to expect detailed treatment of all topics, but the authors have sought to go as far as present information permits. The books are written emphatically as an *agenda*, things to be done in terms of their carefully stated philosophy of planning. The detailed practical approach in each broad case remains still to be completed. This is not a criticism of the work, but a recognition of the fact that the authors have avoided the double danger of dealing loosely with broad concepts or trying to be "more practical" than the data allow. B. W. DEMPSEY.

Plan for Reconstruction, by W. H. Hutt. New York. Oxford University Press. 1944. pp. vii + 328. \$4.50

This book has at least the merit of getting down to brass tacks. It is an effort to meet the challenge to orthodox economists which H. D. Dickinson has formulated in these terms:

"Can they suggest any workable set of institutions in the realm of property, inheritance, contract, money, and business organization which will be compatible with private property and the free market and which will at the same time guarantee the ordinary man a reasonable security of livelihood and prevent the accumulation of wealth (and, what is still more important, the concentration of power over wealth) in the hands of a minority of the community?"

The author, who is a professor of commerce in the University of Cape Town, makes a sincere and detailed effort to answer Mr. Dickinson. His answer, which starts from the conviction that the source of all the trouble in the free enterprise system as it has actually operated is restrictionism in all its manifold forms, will satisfy neither the integral socialists nor the economic liberals. Its acceptance would require a fundamental change in basic attitudes both on the part of business leaders and trade union leaders. But it may be said unequivocally that such a change will have to be brought about if any kind of a just social order is to be achieved in the future.

Mr. Hutt wants to avoid socialism. He wants to preserve economic freedom. But he conceives economic freedom differently than does the National Association of Manufacturers. By economic freedom he means "a productive system commanded by 'consumers sovereignty'." The arrangements which he suggests for the preservation (or rather the realization) of economic freedom do "not imply State passivity." They "exclude any idea of an acquiescent State." Mr. Hutt seeks to preserve economic freedom by substituting "institutional planning" for "pressure-group planning."

Mr. Hutt's program contains the following distinctive features: a system of income-pooling; the trade unions will no longer function to determine the price of labour but to insure income-security; during the elimination of restrictionism a minimum income will be assured all workers by payments in the form of subsidies from a pool to which the workers have contributed; similar arrangements will assure capital security; the State will take some initiative in the field of production through State corporations enjoying no privileges; the institution of property will be revised so as to eliminate from its concept the right to withhold productive power; a Resources Utilization Commission, composed of a determined number of judges, economists, and "men of affairs," will administer the scheme.

This reviewer is not competent to pass judgment upon the economic feasibility of the author's plan. That is a task for the economists. From the point of view of political philosophy it may be said that there is nothing in Mr. Hutt's program that conflicts with sound general doctrine on the role of the State or with sound "Encyclical doctrine" on the same subject. It is necessary to say this in view of tendentious efforts to rationalize "Encyclical doctrine" into a monstrous alliance with disguised forms of an economic liberalism which would deny to the State any active role in the national economy.

The author has formulated the details of his plan in three bills ready for introduction into parliament. The drafts of these bills take up the first fifty-eight pages of his text. The rest of the book is devoted to an explanation of the plan which they embody. While his plan is drawn up for Great Britain, it is not without general interest. GEORGE H. DUNNE.

An Essay on the Economic Effects of the Reformation, by George O'Brien, Litt. D., F. R. Hist. S. Westminster, Md. The Newman Bookshop. 1944. pp. 194. \$2.50

At a time when the widespread social and economic evils which beset the world are clamoring more urgently than ever for study and solution, the reappearance of Dr. O'Brien's Essay, first published in 1923, is a timely contribution to clarity of thinking on the subject. An intelligent understanding of modern day social problems is impossible unless one clearly understand what are the roots of which these problems are the evil fruit; and it is precisely these roots which the author lays bare in this book.

Dr. O'Brien's thesis is that both extremes of modern social thinking, namely Liberal Capitalism and Socialism, have derived from one common source, the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. With clarity and compelling logic he succeeds in substantiating his point very well. The book is interestingly written, and while too short to comprise a detailed treatment of the subject, is a very satisfactory survey of the influence the ideas born of the Reformation had on subsequent economic development in Europe, and eventually in America.

Social and economic life in the Middle Ages was built on the Church, and looked to the Church as the source of its guiding principles and as its ultimate governing authority. Consequently, the Reformation was bound to have far reaching effects on social and economic life, even though essentially a religious and not an economic movement; because in attacking the Church, it attacked the institution which was the very foundation of that life, weakening its authority in economic matters, and destroying the fundamental organic character of medieval society. For with the passing of the Church's authority as the guiding norm of men's social relations, and the substitution of the doctrine of private interpretation in its place, the individual became the arbiter of the morality of his own acts. Private interpretation, coupled with the doctrine of justification by faith alone, with its denial of the necessity of good works, quickly led to the complete separation of morality and religion, the total divorce of economics from ethics, and the rejection of all authority in economic life—all of this culminated in the unbounded individualism of classical *laissez faire* capitalism. The addition to Protestant philosophy made by Calvinism with its insistence on work, on the idea that a man's job was a vocation which he must be allowed to pursue without outside interference, and its doctrine that material success and prosperity are the sign by which the regenerated are known, completed the transition from medieval ethical conceptions of economic life to modern production economics, and the so-called "capitalistic spirit," with its worship of wealth for its own sake, and all the attendant abuses flowing from these.

The reaction to these abuses was not long in coming in the form of Socialism, its own roots sunk deep in Protestant philosophy. For the rejection of original sin which had shortly followed the Reformation had led to the conclusion that society was the cause of man's moral depravity, and to the belief in the perfectibility of man through institutions.

In the final chapter the author summarizes his conclusions, and if the book ends on a not too hopeful note of the possibility of its being carried into effect, a solution capable of solving the modern social problem is clearly outlined—the restoration of a cosmopolitan social ethic, recognized and acted upon by all civilized nations. Only in this way can unity and harmony be restored within and among nations. The author likewise points out that there is only one institution capable of supplying and enforcing such a social creed—the same Church which did so before the Reformation destroyed the effectiveness of its authority in human affairs.

This book is also a timely warning, so much needed at the present time, that Socialism, since it is but one of the twin streams from the common fountain of error that is the Protestant Revolt, can in no way be looked to for the restoration of harmonious relations among men. JAMES J. BERNA.